*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 69348 ***

  TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE

  Italic text is denoted by _underscores_.

  Footnote anchors are denoted by [number], and the footnotes have been
  placed at the end of the book.

  All changes noted in the ERRATA on page 68 have been applied to the
  etext. The erratum for p. 21 should have said l. 34, not l. 3.

  Some minor changes to the text are noted at the end of the book.




                            CONSIDERATIONS

                                ON THE

                            PRESENT PEACE,

                   As far as it is relative to the

                              COLONIES,

                               AND THE

                            AFRICAN TRADE.

                  _Magna est veritas & prævalebit._


                               LONDON:
        Printed for W. BRISTOW, at the West End of St. Paul’s
                       Church-yard. MDCCLXIII.

                        [Price One Shilling.]




TO THE

BRITISH PLANTERS.


  GENTLEMEN,

An uninterested desire of rendering service to the public, and not an
idle whim, or vanity to appear in print, has induced the editors of
the following facts to publish them. Author is a title they lay no
claim to.

By their unornamented energy alone is meant to gain the reader’s
attention, and to enforce the facts advanced; therefore, without
further apology, they are presented to you in a plain dress, to point
out some measures that were taken to mislead the legislature, whereby
the African trade, in the year 1750, was put upon such a plan, as, by
the event, has proved extreamly detrimental to the British colonies.
On that account, the following sheets can be addressed to none so
properly as to you.

We flatter ourselves it will evidently appear by the contents of the
following pamphlet, that the forts on the coast of Africa, are by no
means upon a proper establishment; likewise that the present method
of carrying on the African trade to those parts where the forts are
situated, by the very high price given for Negroes there, which
occasions the profit arising to be divided between the _European_
merchants and the _African_ traders, but must become extreamly
burthensome and disadvantageous to you, we believe every _real
planter_ will allow.

We cannot admit certain individuals to be esteemed _real planters_,
notwithstanding they may have _one_ or _more plantations_, when
at the same time they are concerned as merchants in the colonies,
who procure the ships from the coast of Africa to be consigned to
them; of which it is conjectured (and not without foundation) many
of them are part owners; for these apparent reasons, it being their
interest to keep up the price of Negroes so consigned to them, as
all such advance encreases their commissions. Therefore, in our
humble opinion, no attention ought to be paid to any remonstrance
from people so much interested, or from those merchants who reside in
Europe, that are connected with them, against any proposals that may
be offered for the general utility of the colonies, which has been
the case; and in consequence, very detrimental measures have been
pursued through the misrepresentation of such opponents.

Should such destructive measures be continued, an absolute
diminution of the annual income from your estates in the colonies
must inevitably ensue, whether from the want of Negroes, or your
purchasing them at too high a rate. In either case, it will prevent
your being able to raise as much sugar, and other plantation-product
you would otherwise do, or to take off as great a quantity of the
manufactures of the mother-country, as were you to have a sufficient
number of Negroes at reasonable prices. Relying upon the above
allegations, with those you will find in the course of the following
pamphlet, the editors presume you will think it most expedient
and conducive for your interests, without loss of time, to apply
to the legislative power, in order that some speedy and effectual
measures be taken and carried into execution for _retrieving_, better
_regulating_ and _extending_ that valuable branch of the _British_
commerce, the _African trade_.

The present seems the most proper time for so great a national
purpose, in order to prevent the _French_ getting the start of you,
which they will exert all their _power_ and _abilities_ to _effect_;
for they are now not only making great preparations to carry on that
trade themselves, but they have already made several _contracts_
with _British_ merchants to supply them with _Negroes_. So intent
are they to secure, by every method they can contrive, as great a
number as possible of those useful people, on which the prosperity
of the _French_ colonies depend: besides, as _peace_ is concluded,
his majesty’s ministers, in whose department it is, will have leisure
to examine minutely into the reasons that induced you to make such
application. Therefore there cannot be a doubt from their known
_abilities_, and willingness to promote the _public good_ by their
care of the _trade_ and _commerce_ of these _kingdoms_, but they will
give their most serious attention to any proposal you may lay before
them for so good a purpose, as the _extending_ and _preserving_ the
_African trade_; and will be as desirous as yourselves to pursue
such plan as appears to them most reasonable for promoting the
general advantage of the _British colonies_, and consequently the
_mother-country_. The editors will not intrude farther on your time,
than to hope something will be done to secure that valuable branch
of commerce to the _British subjects_, they being very desirous to
promote the prosperity of the _British colonies_, and to assure you
that they are with great respect,

                                      Gentlemen,

                                          Your most obedient, and most

                                                Humble servants,

  London,
  11 April, 1763.

                                                          The EDITORS.




Considerations on the Peace,

As far as it is relative to the

Colonies, and the African Trade.


Since the preliminary articles of peace were published by authority,
we have heard many persons in coffee-houses and other places, censure
and blame our negotiators, for their not having obtained better terms.

They say, that our acquisitions in North America are of little
consequence: yet when these acquisitions were in possession of
our enemies, they thought them of inestimable value. Can the
mere alienation of any property cause so sudden a diminution of
its original worth? Surely then pique or dislike to some of our
peace-makers, or private interest to have the war continued, must
have hurried these men beyond the bounds of reason. For if they
would give themselves the least time to reflect seriously, and judge
dispassionately, they would find, that by retaining our conquests
in North America (which are extended beyond our most sanguine
expectations) the greatest benefit and utility must arise to this
the mother-country; inasmuch as we have put ourselves in such a
situation not only in the north, but also in the southern parts,
that it is to be hoped our inland settlers will live in a perfect
state of tranquillity; and his majesty’s subjects carry on and
cultivate that great branch of the British commerce, without dread of
the Indians, or interruption from the subjects of any foreign nation.
This good effect surely must be allowed to be of immense importance
and advantage to Great Britain; and would not have been the case if
we had kept the sugar colonies ceded to France, instead of part of
our continental conquests.

What was the occasion of the war but the negotiators of the last
peace not settling the distinct limits and boundaries of the
territories we and the French were to have in North America? We
rejoice those limits are now settled, and hope so effectually as to
prevent future disputes.

Among the many altercations concerning the preliminary articles, and
the abilities of our negotiators, it must be allowed, with respect
to the commercial interest of this country, there is a noble Lord
in high office, and of the cabinet, whole acknowledged capacity,
great application, and long experience, at a board where he so
judiciously and eminently presided, made him a most competent judge
what measures were proper to be taken for the security, improvement,
and extension of the trade and commerce of Great-Britain and her
colonies. Therefore, we cannot doubt, but his majesty has been well
and faithfully advised as to that part of our pacific negotiations;
because the patriotic spirit, honour and integrity of that nobleman
are universally known and approved. It is not amiss to lay down as
a maxim, that in general the information of merchants is not to be
depended on by the legislature, with respect to trade and commerce,
for many other, besides this principal reason; to wit—A trade may be
very profitable to a particular merchant, city or town, and, at the
same time, be very pernicious to the general interest of the nation,
is a most notorious fact. Have we not heard many falsehoods asserted,
and seen many erroneous calculations laid before the public, with an
interested view of obtaining such private ends, and of defeating in
some very essential points the public welfare?

Whatever self-interested people may clamour to the contrary, there
cannot be a doubt but his majesty and his ministers, in their
negociations, have given the most serious attention to the universal
good of this country, without confining their views, or partially
regarding whether _North America_ is more valuable than the _Sugar
Islands_, because each merited their notice and care, being both
of inestimable value to the mother-country, and reciprocally so to
each other; and all three so essentially connected, that whatever
happens to the disadvantage of the one, must in proportion affect the
other. For the West India islands depend upon _North America_, in a
great measure, for provisions, mill, and other timber; as well as
for horses, cattle, and many things absolutely necessary for the use
of the plantations; which are paid for in _specie_, _sugar_, _rum_,
melasses, and other plantation-produce: moreover, the melasses being
distilled into rum in _North America_, are of great advantage to
the merchants there, in carrying on the African trade directly from
thence, which enables them to make returns for those manufactures,
_&c._ they receive from hence with greater facility. All possible
care should be taken to prevent his majesty’s subjects purchasing
sugar, rum, and particularly melasses, in the French islands, by
prohibiting their importation into North America, by laying a higher
duty upon those articles than that laid by an act, made in the sixth
year of his late majesty’s reign, entitled, “An act for the better
securing and encouraging the trade of his majesty’s sugar colonies,
_&c._” whereby such high duties were laid on all foreign sugars,
rums, and melasses, to be imported into any of his majesty’s colonies
in America, as, it was thought, would answer all the ends of a
prohibition.

But experience has shewn that law, and also those passed in the 12th
and 15th _Car._ II. are too weak to answer the purposes for which
they were designed; and that some more effectual remedies must be
found to prevent the British traders of North America importing
foreign sugar, rum, and melasses, which was a great trade carried on
by them from the French islands before the war; and by that means the
commodities from North America, wanted in the sugar islands, were
greatly advanced to the British planters. And as the northern traders
often refused to take any thing from them but ready money, which
drained them of almost all their gold and silver, for want of which
they were often brought into great distress; therefore all the money
the North American traders used to receive from the British planters,
was carried to foreign sugar colonies, and there laid out in the
purchase of sugar, rum, and melasses, which were carried to our
northern colonies, and there supplied the place of sugar, rum, and
melasses from the British sugar islands; and consequently robbed them
not only of the consumption of so much of their product, but also of
their gold and silver too.

Whereas if the planters in the foreign colonies were obliged to
purchase what they want from the British subjects with ready money
only, and not allowed to give their sugar, rum, and melasses in
barter for the same, it would make the balance of that trade for the
future much more in our favour than it has been against us; because
we having so greatly extended the British dominion on the continent
of America, the French in their sugar islands cannot be supplied with
what they want from thence but by the English; therefore the British
traders may chuse to be paid for their merchandizes in such manner
as they shall please, which the French will be under a necessity of
complying with.

It is well known to those who are acquainted with the sugar islands,
that the profits of the planter depend upon the vent he finds for
his rum and melasses; for if sugar only, and no rum and melasses
could be produced from the sugar cane, it would hardly pay the
expence of culture, and manufacturing it into sugar. Therefore as the
consumption of rum and melasses is stopped or increased, the sugar
colonies (whether English or foreign) must respectively thrive or
decline. And as rum is not allowed to be imported into old France, or
any of its colonies (because it interferes with brandy, which is the
product of the mother-country) this evidently shews how much it is in
the power of Great-Britain to check the progress of the French sugar
islands, and advance that of her own. For if the bringing French rum
and melasses into any of the British dominions, can be effectually
stopped, all the profits made by rum and melasses, in the French
sugar colonies, would be lost to them; because they could find no
vent for it in any other part of the world.

This point strictly attended, and invariably adhered to, and the
African trade secured to the British subjects, to the extent of their
natural and undoubted right, would diminish the growth of sugar in
the French islands, and increase it in our own; and might, with the
addition of our new acquisitions, very probably in the course of
some years, be a means of enabling the English to undersell them
at all foreign markets in Europe, and confine them to their own
consumption. Therefore it is humbly submitted to the consideration
of the legislative power, whether this trade, so apparently hurtful
to the national interest of this kingdom, (which will most certainly
be carried on in the same manner it was before the war) ought not
to be stopped without delay; and the importation of foreign sugar,
rum, or melasses, into any of the British colonies in North America,
prohibited under such penalties, and with such encouragements to
inform and seize, as may be adequate to the crime, in order to put an
effectual stop to such a pernicious and destructive commerce.

From what has been before observed, it will, it is presumed,
evidently appear how necessary it must be for the advantage of the
British sugar colonies, to promote as much as possible the sale and
consumption of rum and melasses, upon which, in a great measure, the
well-being and prosperity of the planters depend. On that account,
and in order to promote such desirable purpose, suppose the duties on
melasses, and the excise on rum, were to be lowered, such procedure
would favour our plantations in their rivalship with France, and
the lessening these duties will, in a great measure, prevent the
smuggling of foreign brandy to such a degree, as may probably augment
the revenue arising therefrom, by a greater quantity of rum and
melasses being disposed of, which consequently must considerably
encrease our navigation; and the disadvantage to our rivals in trade
will be in proportion to our success. Besides, rum, if it can be
got at a reasonable rate, will greatly increase the consumption of
malt spirits, by mixing them in such proportion as are suitable to
the palate of an infinite variety of people. This is evident from
the great quantities, and the various prices that spirits are sold
for under the denomination of rum, which are from 5_s._ or 7_s._ to
10_s._ _per_ gallon.

The trade carried on between Great Britain, Ireland, North America,
the West India islands and Africa, is of greater advantage to this
country, than all our other trades whatsoever, arising from the great
exportation of _British_ manufactures, _East India_ goods, provisions
as well as _linens_ from _Ireland_, which are paid for with _specie_,
_sugar_, _tobacco_, _rice_, _cotton_, and other plantation-produce;
and with the commodities of _Africa_, such as _gold dust_, _bees
wax_, _elephants teeth_, _gum Senegal_, various sorts of _dying
woods_, and particularly _Negroes for the plantations_; whence it
manifestly appears, upon the African trade, and the invaluable
commerce of our colonies, above two-thirds of the British navigation
depends; and for this very obvious reason it may be asserted, that in
the vessels employed for said traffic, the most useful sailors for
manning his majesty’s navy (the great bulwark of this nation) are
bred; because they are inured to the manner of living on board ships,
as well in the hot as in the cold climates; which is not the case of
sailors taken out of coasting vessels, colliers, and traders to the
north seas, as hath been frequently experienced by the many (very
useful) lives in our expeditions to the East and West Indies being
lost; and that fatality was chiefly owing to their not having been
accustomed to live on salt provisions, and to bear the excessive heat
of the climate, which they were unacquainted with, and unpractised in.

To prevent the like catastrophes hereafter, when occasion shall
require, we would propose the chusing out of the several ships
that may lie in the harbours of Great-Britain, such sailors only
as shall have been a voyage or more to the hot countries, to man
such expedition fleets for those parts of the world, where the sun’s
power is strong, as the more probable means of preserving the lives
of a great number of those valuable sailors, who may not have had a
seasoning, and have been mostly employed in the coasting trade and
short voyages.

We have been induced to throw out this hint, in hopes that it may
engage the attention of some more able pen, to form a scheme for such
a good, humane, and noble end, before the commencement of another
war.[1]

It must be allowed by those who have a general knowledge of the
trade and commerce of _Great-Britain_ and _Ireland_, that the
_Negro-trade_ on the coast of _Africa_, is the chief and fundamental
support of the _British colonies_, by supplying them with that race
of useful people called Negroes, to be employed in cultivating the
lands. But when there is either a deficiency of them, or that they
are purchaseable but at high prices, then such checks must greatly
impoverish our British planters; and in consequence, considerably
diminish the wealth, power, trade and navigation of these kingdoms,
the encrease of which has been, in a great measure, owing to the
extensive commerce to and from our colonies and plantations:
therefore their not being properly supplied with Negroes, must
be extremely detrimental to them; which induces us to make some
observations upon a memorial taken notice of in the _Public Ledger_,
of the third of November last, wherein it was asserted, that sir
_William Meredith_, one of the representatives in parliament for the
town of _Liverpool_, had presented a memorial to the right honourable
the earl of _Egremont_, one of his majesty’s principal secretaries
of state, “setting forth the great advantages of the trade of
_Guadaloupe, where they received_ 334,605_l._ 11_s._ 2_d._[2] for
12,347 slaves, the cargoes of 41 ships, purchased in Africa with
British manufactures; praying that the possession of that island
might be thought of in the negotiation for peace, if not incompatible
with the general scheme of affairs.” This memorial we could not have
expected from that quarter, recollecting that the great _Hardman_ is
no more. Had he been living, it would not have been wondered at, as
he was noted for his contriving, and being industrious at procuring
and presenting, memorials and petitions. He even influenced some
_merchants_ of the town of Rippon in Yorkshire, to petition the
parliament, when that great and important trade to Africa was under
its consideration. He likewise prevailed on many other towns to
petition, all as little interested and connected with the trade of
Africa, as Rippon; and said Rippon was never famous for any other
manufactory, that we could hear of, but that of making spurs; and
the cream of the jest is, that not a single pair, as a commercial
article, was ever sent to Africa; at the same time many other
measures were pursued, very singular methods taken, and absolute
untruths asserted as facts, to mislead the legislature, in order, as
it is supposed, to prevent the forts and settlements being put upon
a proper establishment, that were all as inconsistent as the Rippon
petition.

It was at that period boldly advanced at the bar of the house of
Commons, and with great industry propagated among the members, that
the forts in _Africa_ were only useful, as marks of possession
and sovereignty; which, if true, why has 19,565_l._ 14_s._ 2_d._
sterling been expended in building part of a fort at _Anamaboa_, to
the 30th June, 1756, as appears by the African committee’s accounts
to that time, when the further building of that fort was put under
the direction of the board of ordnance[3]? which sum has been since
paid by the public more than the annual grant of 10,000_l._ then
insisted as sufficient for the support of the forts. But we have been
informed, those prevaricating advocates have since altered their
opinion, and think it a very inadequate sum for such purpose: and it
appears by the votes of the honourable house of Commons, application
has been made to parliament to enlarge the annual grant; and there
was granted for the year 1761, 13,000_l._ and for the year 1762, the
like sum, by which it is conjectured the said advocates have found
it absolutely necessary that the forts ought to be kept in a better
state than that of marks of _possession_ and _sovereignty_ only.

But that cannot be done, when we consider in what manner the money
granted by parliament to the African committee, is appropriated in
Africa, which the government never receives any account of.

The great argument made use of to the then ministers[4], to obtain
a dissolution of the late African company, by the advocates for
the present system, was, that 10,000_l._ was quite adequate and
sufficient for the support and maintenance of the forts. This, we
believe, was one of the strongest reasons for those ministers
adopting their scheme, which had as much truth in it, as many other
assertions at that time made use of.

The late company, from their experience, insisted that sum was very
insufficient; which it really was, even to give in presents annually
to the principal natives, to cultivate such an interest as is not
only necessary, but absolutely essential to support and promote the
honour, power, jurisdiction, and trade of Great Britain on the coast
of Africa. However, there has been granted, since the forts were put
under the care of the present Africa committee for their support,
from 2d February, 1751, to 2d February, 1763, 136,000_l._ which is
11,333_l._ 6_s._ 8_d._ _per annum_, exclusive of what was expended
in building the fort at Annamaboa. Notwithstanding said grants,
the forts have not been kept even[5] as marks of possession and
sovereignty; which undeniable truth the editors are ready to prove,
if called upon.

Mourn! mourn! O _Liverpool_, for the loss of thy great hero and
champion, who was at all times ready to enter the lists in defence
of thy trade and commerce. But, Britain rejoice; for what may have
been for the advantage of the town of _Liverpool_, might be greatly
detrimental and prejudicial to the general trade and commerce of
this country and its colonies; which surely must clearly appear from
the beforementioned memorial. For we believe it will be allowed,
if we were to encrease and extend the number of our colonies in
North America, and the West Indies, it would be disadvantageous to
Great Britain, unless they can be supplied with a sufficient number
of people for their defence and cultivation, at as reasonable
an expence as possible; without taking the hands that are useful
and necessary in husbandry, and the several manufactures of the
mother-country.

Then surely, as Guadaloupe was surrendered by capitulation to the
British arms, no longer than since the 4th day of May, 1759; and as
the merchants of _Liverpool_ had imported 12,347 Negroes into that
island some months ago, which must have been the case, or they could
not have had so exact an account; we may well conclude that a great
number of Negroes have also been carried to _Guadaloupe_, and the
other conquered islands, by the merchants of _London_, _Bristol_,
and other ports, that carry on a trade to _Africa_, and have been
carrying negroes from the time they had the last accounts, which we
may suppose to be at least six months preceding the merchants of
_Liverpool_’s memorial being presented to lord Egremont.

This must be undoubtedly of great advantage to the _French_ planters,
and extremely detrimental to our North American and West India
colonies, for want of the _Negroes_ that have been sold to those
conquered islands; which must consequently cause a scarcity, and
enhance the price of those carried to the real colonies of Great
Britain. Because the merchants of _Liverpool_, and others concerned
in the _African_ trade, must be truly sensible, that they can
find beneficial markets in our colonies for treble the number of
Negroes they can purchase with _British_ manufactures. So that the
consumption of those manufactures is not encreased, as they would
insinuate, by their selling Negroes to the _French islands_ (for
so we must call them while they have _French inhabitants_) when
the selling such Negroes is so apparently disadvantageous to our
colonies that are inhabited by British subjects; on which account
we submit, whether as we are to give back to France _Martinico_,
_Guadaloupe_, _Marigalante_, _Deserade_, and _St. Lucia_, orders
should not be immediately sent to the governors of such islands, to
prevent _British_ subjects selling any Negroes to the _French_, which
it would be impolitic to do, even were we to have kept possession of
them.

The ships that have been fitted out, and are upon their voyages with
an intention to sell Negroes on the _French islands_, may dispose
of them in the adjacent _British colonies_, where they will meet
with purchasers for any number, at such prices as will make their
voyages profitable. Therefore such order will not be hurtful to the
merchants, but of great advantage to the _British planters_, and
consequently so to this country.

It is for that reason we insist it was our interest to return those
islands to France, to whom (if proper steps are pursued by us) they
must and will become a continual expence, burthen and incumbrance;
nor would our retention of them have been an advantage to us: for as
the inhabitants are _French_, we must always have kept a military
force there at a very great expence, of which recruiting would be no
small part. And one great consideration ought to be, the _number of
British subjects that would die in that unhealthy climate_, if they
were only the soldiers that must annually be sent to complete the
regiments necessary to be kept on that service. That service alone
would be productive of a great expence; and the loss of so many
subjects would prove very detrimental to _Great Britain_.

Besides, for argument’s sake, let us suppose we had kept _Martinico_,
_Guadaloupe_, _St. Lucia_, _Marigalante_ and _Deserade_, it would
have been highly disadvantageous to the _British planters_, and
must prejudice them much in their circumstances, so as in a short
time to reduce the old _British_ sugar islands, now so populous
and flourishing, to such a state, that it made us tremble to think
of it; because the British _African_ traders would supply those
islands taken from the French with Negroes, in preference to the
old _British_ colonies; which fully appears by the number they have
been supplied with already; and as those islands are now ceded to
France, will be of great advantage to the planters therein, by
their having been in our possession, on account of the Negroes they
have purchased to cultivate their plantations. And had we kept
said islands, as soon as they had been sufficiently stock’d, they
would have carried on a trade for the redundant Negroes with their
countrymen at _St. Domingo_. Hence it appears, that great care must
be taken to prevent their having it in their power so to do after
those islands are restored to France; as we do not in the least
doubt, but from the intercourse our countrymen have had with them for
the sake of profit, contracts will be made for such anti-national
purpose. And such a commerce would enable them and the planters
of _St. Domingo_ to cultivate sugar and other plantation-produce
sufficient to supply all Europe; and by such means prevent Great
Britain’s reaping the advantage that she derives from the exportation
of the produce of her colonies: which is so essential a benefit to
her, and is one of the first causes of our receiving a balance of
trade from foreign countries, and in which the landed interest,
merchants and manufacturers of _Great Britain_ and _Ireland_, as also
the _planters_ and _merchants_ in our _colonies_, are so materially
concerned and interested. For the lands in Britain must always rise
and fall in proportion as our manufactures and navigation prosper or
decline, and the national revenue encrease or diminish, as the trade
of our colonies is in a more or less flourishing way.

Therefore is it not evident, that there is not a man in this kingdom,
who, in proportion to his possession and property in the community,
does not partake of the benefits and advantages accruing from the
_African_, _North American_, and _West Indian_ trades; and who would
not be a sufferer in proportion to his situation in life, should
they diminish, by falling into the hands of people belonging to any
other nation? where, supposing it to be the case, the profit of those
valuable trades must consequently center.

For notwithstanding the advantage the French inhabitants would have
had by our retention of those islands, they would take nothing from
us for the use of themselves, or their plantations, but what they
were obliged to out of the greatest necessity; as we have no wines
to supply them with, which are proper for that country: so that they
would have their wines, and every thing else they could possibly
procure, from France; having been accustomed from their infancy
to wear French, which they would ever look on as their own native
manufactures. And sorry we are to say, too many of them are used in
the British colonies, as well as in this country. For which reason
they would always have a dislike to British manufactures, and that
would induce them to pursue every measure to smuggle their own into
those islands; and for the sake of profit, many English traders would
be induced to carry them from the Isle of Man, Guernsey, Jersey, and
other places, in preference to those of their own country, which has
already been the case. But supposing it not so, the real profits
of those islands, while possessed by French inhabitants, would not
center in Great Britain, but in France; because, on account of the
difference in religion, they would send their children thither for
education, and make provision for themselves to retire there, always
looking upon it as their home. Even so our planters do in regard to
Great Britain; for all those who go to the West Indies, or are born
there, have no intention to end their days in that climate, but are
always aiming to lay by a sufficiency to go home, as they call it;
that is, the _English_ planters to come to _Great Britain_, and the
_French_ to _France_.

By what has hitherto been advanced, surely it will evidently appear
to every impartial reader, that had we retain’d the French sugar
islands, they would not have been of any advantage to this country,
but on the contrary. It is not the number of islands, where sugar,
tobacco, rice, and other plantation-products are raised, that will
be advantageous to this or any other country, without they can be
supplied with a sufficient number of Negroes for their cultivation;
the land being all tilled by hand-labour with the hoe, as there is no
ploughing with oxen and horses in the West Indies, except in Jamaica,
where two or three planters have used the plough to some part of
their plantations, where the soil was light, and of a sandy nature;
and all other work is done by _Negroes_, as Europeans cannot do any
laborious work there.

Their field _labourers_, sugar _boilers_, _distillers_, _coopers_,
_mill-wrights_, _carpenters_, _masons_, _builders_, _smiths_, and
house _servants_, are _blacks_; therefore it is not the number of
islands, but the greatest number of the _best Negroes_ that benefit
the mother-country, _which sort_ we can make appear, the French
since the year 1729, in times of peace, to the commencement of the
present war, have been constantly supplied with. That is one of the
true causes why they have produced such quantities of sugar, and
other plantation-product; that for several years before the war, they
were become our rivals at foreign markets, so far as to draw from
thence a great annual balance of trade in favour of France.[6] But
this _effect_ would have been prevented, if proper measures had been
pursued by us for the preservation of the _African_ trade, to that
part of _Africa_ where the hardy Negroes, who are inured to labour in
their own country, were to be purchased.

The French, from the year 1729, to the end of the year 1738, carried
from the _Gold Coast_, _Popo_ and _Whydah_, _fifteen_ or _seventeen
thousand_ of those valuable people annually; when _four thousand_,
in any one year during that period, were not carried to the British
plantations; which is the truest reason that can be assigned for the
prosperity of the French colonies, and the main spring of the great
increase of their product. For they do not understand the cultivation
and management of a plantation in any degree equal to the British
planters: therefore their advantage and success has been owing, in a
great measure, to the good and hardy labourers they have had to till
their land, and manufacture the product of it.

We doubt not but the merchants trading to Africa will say, they
have imported since the year 1729, more Negroes into the _British_
sugar islands, than the _French_ have to theirs in time of peace
(to the commencement of the present war). We admit they have, of
Negroes from _Gambia_, _Calabar_, _Boney_, _Benin_, the _windward
coast_, and _Angola_. But we take upon us to assert, they cannot
with truth say, they have imported to the colonies as many Negroes
from the _Gold Coast_, _Popo_, and _Whidah_, which are the most
valuable for the laborious cultivation of the sugar cane, and other
plantation-product, and manufacturing it into sugar and rum, for the
following seasons.

The _Gold Coast_, _Popo_, and _Whidah_ Negroes are born in a part
of Africa that is very barren; a small bullock carried thither from
another part, when fatted, will sell for near 32_l._ a sheep for
20_s._ four small fowls for 4_s._ sterling, and all other provisions
in proportion, except fish; and their coarse kind of bread, which
is their chief food. On that account, when able to take the hoe
in hand, they are obliged to go and cultivate the land for their
subsistance. They also live hardily; so that when they are carried
to our plantations (as they have been used to hard labour from their
infancy) they become a strong, robust people, and can live upon the
sort of food the planters allow them; which is, bread made of Indian
corn, and fish, such as herrings and pilchards sent from Britain,
and dried fish from North America, being such food as they lived
upon in their own country. Indeed they live better in general in our
plantations; and they are always ready, on their arrival there, to go
to the hard work necessary in planting and manufacturing the sugar
cane.

On the other hand, the _Gambia_, _Calabar_, _Boney_, and _Angola_
Negroes are brought from those parts of _Africa_, that are extremely
fertile, where every thing grows almost spontaneously; and where a
bullock may be bought for less than 20_s._ a sheep for 1_s._ and a
dozen of fowls for the same. They have every other necessary of life
in great plenty. On that account, the men never work, but lead an
indolent life, and are in general of a lazy disposition and tender
constitution; for the necessary work among them is done by the women,
which is little more than fetching wood to dress their victuals: so
that when those people are carried to our sugar islands, they are
obliged to be nursed, to be taken great care of, and brought to work
by degrees.

The planters, when the _Gold Coast_ and _Whidah_ Negroes were carried
to the sugar colonies, before the _French_ interfered in that trade,
found there was not a sufficient number to extend their cultivation,
by carrying on all the different planting business, and therefore
were accustomed to purchase those tender (the worst sort of) Negroes,
and employ them for household servants, to raise corn, aloes, look
after cattle, bring them up to trades and easy labour, knowing them
unfit for the hard work necessary in sugar-plantations.

The Negroes of the river _Gambia_ are better than the last-mentioned;
both of which are much more proper for the North American planters,
as they have plenty of provisions at a small expence, and, on that
account, can use them to gentle labour, and inure them, by degrees,
to work with the same sort of food they were accustomed to in their
own country.

But that is not the case of the planters in the sugar islands; which
sufficiently proves how disadvantageous it must be to have such
imported there, in preference to those that would be so immediately
useful and serviceable, or to let the French purchase the better sort.

Yet such has been the case, it being for the interest of the African
merchants to supply the _British_ planters with the inferior sort, as
each Negro costs much less on the coast of _Angola_, &c. than those
from the _Gold Coast_, &c. which saves a great deal in the outset of
the cargoes sent to _Africa_, and consequently greatly encreases the
net profit on the voyages, as the tender and worst sort of Negroes
will sell in the sugar islands for near as great a price each as the
best, provided there is none of the latter at market; and a greater
number of the former being subject to die, must encrease the demand.

This we thought proper to take notice of, to shew how necessary
it will be for the interest of this country, that the French
should not for the future be allowed to trade in _Africa_, at cape
_Appollonia_, or between it and the river _Volta_, where, and at
_Popo_ and _Whidah_, to the eastward of that river, the valuable
Negroes beforementioned, adapted by their natural constitution for
cultivating the sugar plantations, are to be purchased; otherwise
in times of peace, they will be constantly making encroachments as
heretofore; so that when the late company’s governor at _Cape Coast
Castle_ saw a _French_ vessel upon the Gold Coast, he used to order
an officer to go on board with a message to the following purport.

  “You are ordered on board the _French_ vessel, to tell the master,
  the governor and council do not make trade with the subjects of
  _France_,[7] nor do they suffer the natives to trade with them.
  But as there subsists a good friendship and alliance between the
  king of Great Britain and the French king, if the master should be
  distressed for water, or such like necessaries, he might have it
  upon application, by admitting an officer on board, to prevent his
  having intercourse with the natives, or others, till he should have
  received such supplies; but that he should not be allowed to trade
  to the westward of the river _Volta_, which if he attempted, proper
  measures would be taken to prevent and obstruct his commerce.
  Therefore, should he neglect those orders, and receive any damage
  thereby, it would be his own fault; as the governor and council
  held the trade of the _Gold Coast_, the indubitable right and
  property of THE ROYAL AFRICAN COMPANY OF ENGLAND.”

This warning sometimes had the desired effect; at others, the
governor and council were obliged to arm vessels to drive them off,
which occasioned the masters of French ships to protest against the
said governor and council. The protests were sent to them by the
chevalier _Glandeuves_, commodore of _le Content_ and _Oriflamme_,
two French men of war, in his letters dated _Annamaboa Road_, the 9th
and 12th of February, 1751, wherein he insisted that the French had
an undoubted right to trade to any part of Africa, out of gun-shot of
any European fort.

How far the then governor and council were justifiable, in arming
private ships to defend and preserve the trade and commerce under
their care in time of peace, or any future council may be for
exerting themselves in a like manner, we will not undertake to say;
but are fully satisfied the French will go thither, and that the
governor of the fort at Annamaboa will not be able to prevent their
having intercourse with the natives, but by arming vessels to see
them to the eastward of the river _Volta_. For we are of opinion,
property and right are not to be tamely given up in that part of
the world, in hopes of relief from our administration at home; it
being so remote from the giving of immediate redress, and distant
from appeal; or at least, it has happened so in all complaints made
to former ministers. Many instances thereof can be given, which
induced us to lay before the public the foregoing observations, as
the present seems the most proper time to have such rights settled,
to prevent future disputes between the subjects of both nations,
which if not prevented in an effectual manner, by putting the forts
upon an establishment, that the officers commanding them may be in
such situation, as to protect the trade under their care from the
encroachments of any foreigners, will inevitably happen.

It is also necessary to remark, that the French should not be
permitted to re-settle a factory they had before the war at _Abreda_,
about a league below _James Fort_, in the river _Gambia_, which was
destroyed by that gallant sea officer, and brave commander Sir George
Pocock, in the year 1744, but settled again after the peace; and
again destroyed this war by Capt. Marsh, commander of his majesty’s
ship Harwich.

If they are not permitted to re-establish that factory, and the trade
of _Gambia_ and _Senegal_ rivers are pursued in a proper manner,
_Goree_ will be of no consequence, but an expence to France, for
many good reasons we think it improper at present to enlarge upon;
knowing there is a work in hand that will soon be published, wherein
all the advantages of the _African trade_ are fully considered from
the time LETTERS PATENT were granted by king Charles the second, the
27th day of September, 1672, to establish and incorporate the late
royal African company of England; shewing how the trade was carried
on by that company, and the true cause of their having been rendered
unable to support their forts and settlements without the aid of
government, with the ill consequences that attended the decay of that
valuable branch of British commerce, on which the prosperity of our
colonies, and so many branches of our manufactures, depend; followed
by observations on the qualities of manufactures sent thither, and
the regulations that it is necessary should be made regarding the
same. To which will be added, a plan to revive and extend that trade
to the inland parts of _Africa_, so as the most valuable Negroes may
be secured for the British planters, as the only means to prevent the
growth of the French colonies, or at least to make them extremely
expensive and burthensome to their mother-country; and, on the
contrary, ours to become of the greatest benefit and advantage to
Great Britain and Ireland.

Senegal is most certainly a great and valuable acquisition to this
country, if put upon a proper establishment, as it will secure to us
all the gum trade, so useful in our manufactures, and will greatly
encrease the slave, gold and ivory trades in _Gambia_ river. For
when Senegal was in possession of the French, by means of a fort
they had at _Gallam_, about five hundred miles from the sea up that
river (since the decline of the late Africa company, by no factory
being kept at _Fatatenda_, about the same distance up _Gambia_ river)
intercepted the greatest part of the slave, ivory and gold trades,
that came from the several inland countries to the north east of
those rivers: therefore, if proper steps are taken, those trades may
be greatly encreased and extended at an inconsiderable expence, not
having the subjects of any foreign nation to interest themselves
against such a scheme.

The African merchants, to vindicate themselves in carrying on the
trade for the _worst Negroes_ in preference to the other, give out,
that the better sort are not to be come at. But there is no other
grounds for such an assertion, than that the roads to those great
and populous inland countries lying at the back of the forts and
settlements on the _Gold Coast_, have been stopt since the year 1738,
which has prevented all intercourse with the natives, except those
who live within about fifty miles of the sea-coast; whereby a stop
was put to that great trade which came down, when the roads were
kept open by the power and influence of the company’s officers,
and by their alliance and friendship with the several princes and
people in power, living in the different _countries near_, and in the
_towns_ on the said _roads_, that were opened and settled by the late
company’s officers at a very great expence.

One great reason for the decline of their power and influence was,
by the masters of private trading vessels putting in practice every
measure they could invent to vilify and render the company’s officers
insignificant and contemptible to the inland people and Negroes under
their command.

By which sinister machinations, they lost that weight and authority
so necessary for them to act as protectors of the injured, and
mediators in adjusting and deciding disputes that frequently happen
between _African_ princes; which if the company’s officers cannot
accomplish by policy, presents, or amicable measures, they should
be maintained in such a respectable situation, as to be able to
join the injured party, and to compel the refractory to accommodate
matters[8], so as to procure peace, and bring the country to a state
of tranquillity.

For it is a mistaken notion, that the company’s officers (during
their command) created wars between the _African_ chiefs, in order
to purchase the prisoners, which should be made on either side. This
falsehood was propagated also at a certain time, to serve particular
purposes. On the contrary, slaves are bred in the inland parts of
_Africa_, and sent for sale, according to the want those people are
in for _European_ manufactures; the same as an ox or horse is taken
to market, when a farmer in England wants money to pay his rent, or
for other purposes. Every man in Africa is looked upon to be a man
of property and power in proportion to the number of Negroes he is
possessed of.

When such disputes as above glanced at happen, the consequence is an
immediate stoppage of the roads by those people nearest the sea-side,
to prevent their adversaries getting guns, powder, or any other
necessaries for war; which in 1738 occasioned the king of _Warsaw_,
and his allies, to draw a discriminating line along the _Gold Coast_
for that intent; and this hath ever since prevented all intercourse
and trade with the inland natives in the direct way; as also any
gold or slaves for sale coming from them, except a few stolen away
by the king of _Warsaw_’s soldiers, with a little gold; and an
inconsiderable number of slaves brought from the great kingdom of
_Ashantee_, in a very difficult and dangerous way, by the traders of
that country, in order to purchase guns and powder at the _British_,
_Dutch_, and _Danish_ forts at _Acra_.

These traders are obliged to come and return in arm’d bodies, many
miles round about through strange countries, where they are afraid
of being plundered by the natives of their European goods, and are
themselves in danger of being seized upon, and sold as slaves, which
prevents their bringing the trade down as usual.

Consequently, whenever the proper roads are open, and protection
given, there will be a great number of slaves, gold dust and
elephants teeth brought down to the sea-side, to purchase British
manufactures for supplying the inhabitants of those extensive
countries, that have stood in need of them so many years.

The obstructing of such intercourse has occasioned our planters being
deprived of fifteen or twenty thousand of the best and most useful
Negroes yearly for their plantations,[9] and Great Britain has
thereby also been prevented from receiving _fifty or sixty thousand
ounces_ of gold dust,[10] besides thirty or forty tons of elephants
teeth annually.[11]

It is highly probable that _Africa_ abounds with gold mines, richer
than those in the Brazil, or in any other country; for the late
African company, in the infancy of their trade, imported from their
settlements on that coast, from the year 1675 to the year 1690,
as much gold as was coined at the Tower into 400,000 guineas[12],
exclusive of what was sent and brought home by their officers and
servants, who were always paid their salaries and commissions
upon the trade they made in that commodity, which must have been
no inconsiderable quantity; because, as the company extended
their forts and settlements upon the Gold Coast, their gold trade
increased so much, that they were used to take in exchange for
British manufactures, and East India goods in _Africa_, upwards
of two thousand ounces of gold weekly, which can be proved from
authentic vouchers, and continued so to do until such time as the
private traders made incroachments upon them, and overstocked the
country with goods by their competitions with each other, which the
natives took the advantage of, and insisted upon the traders lowering
the price of European merchandize, and raising those of Africa, by
keeping their slaves, gold and ivory up to an exorbitant price, and
thereby getting as great a quantity of goods, for a few slaves, as
was sufficient for their consumption; and was the cause of fewer
being brought from the inland countries, as by the high prices,
before observed, the Negroes got what goods they wanted for the small
number sold, which also prevented their bringing gold to market, and
by which means that valuable branch of the _African_ trade, of such
importance to this country, was in a great measure destroyed, and the
profits thereof centered with the natives of _Africa_.

We believe the private traders will admit they have not altogether
imported from _Africa_ into these kingdoms two thousand ounces
of gold annually[13]; and that since the act of parliament for
dissolving the late company, and putting the forts and settlements
under the management of the committee of the company of merchants
trading to Africa, the officers commanding there, have not taken gold
sufficient to pay the annual salaries of their servants, though they
are fewer in number than those that were kept by the late company.

From what has been stated, we conjecture it will appear, that the
_British_ forts in _Africa_ are not upon a proper plan; if they
were, the commanding officers for the committee of the company of
merchants trading to _Africa_, would, in eleven years and upwards,
have opened those roads (which have been so long stopt) that the
colonies and mother-country might receive those great benefits and
advantages beforementioned, by having the trade brought down to the
forts without interruption, from the remotest parts of _Africa_, as
it was in the time of the late company’s prosperity; but that has not
been done, and as the British traders declined that trade many years
before the _French_ seized the opportunity of stepping in, and reaped
so great advantages thereby, as to have carried to their colonies,
not fewer than one hundred and fifty thousand of those useful people,
from the year 1729 to the year 1739.

This induces us to think, that the _British_ merchants forsook that
trade, and made the opposition they did to the late company, to get
the forts and settlements under their management, to prevent other
people putting them upon a proper establishment, that might hinder
the French making the encroachments they have made in time of peace
(and consequently carrying to their plantations those most useful
people) in order to follow their more favourite trades to _Benin_,
_Calabar_, and the coast of _Angola_, because there they can purchase
three hundred Negroes with a cargo of 3600_l._ value, when that
number upon the Gold Coast would cost in March last 4950_l._[14].
Therefore we fear the private interest of said opposers rather gained
an ascendency over them, to the great prejudice and disadvantage
of the British colonies and the mother-country, and to the great
emolument of the French; which we thought proper to observe at this
juncture, and to hint also, that it will be more fully set forth in
the description of the African trade beforementioned.

We hope to see a minister at the head of the administration in this
country, devoid of faction and corruption, that no private pique
or prejudice against person or party will so far influence him, as
not to pay a due and impartial attention to what is laid before
the legislative power, relative to that valuable branch of British
commerce, the _African_ trade.

We shall rejoice that such enquiries will not for the future be
prevented by ministerial direction, as happened at a certain
period, when it had cost great pains and expence to bring a matter
of the utmost importance to this country to a hearing, which was
frustrated, by putting a previous question in a great assembly on
purpose to prevent such enquiry; notwithstanding several persons
had been examined with respect to the _African_ trade, as well as
the expenditure of public money[15]; and for no other reason, as
we could learn, or can conceive, than[15] that one of the greatest
planters in the world (who at this time so worthily fills the first
office in this metropolis) promoted said enquiry; which, under a wise
and able minister, would have been a sufficient reason for examining
minutely into an affair of such national consequence.

For what must be prejudicial to that planter’s interest, must in
proportion be so to every other in the sugar colonies: and those of
small property must feel the effects of being supplied with the worst
sort of Negroes at exorbitant prices, more than those of affluent
circumstances.

We have the honour to know that gentleman well, and are fully
satisfied he was induced to exert himself in behalf of that enquiry,
not from a motive of private interest, but for the general good of
all those interested in, and concerned for the prosperity of the
_British_ colonies.

We therefore hope he will long live to employ his great abilities in
promoting all good, and opposing all bad measures, with that zeal
and spirit he hath always done, as also to prevent, to the utmost
of his power, any minister (hereafter) daring to smuggle accounts
into a certain assembly, although great objections had been made to
them, before those objections were canvassed and cleared up; and
that he will ever oppose the issuing public money intended for other
services, till a satisfactory account is given, which has been the
case[16]. However, we shall not at present enlarge further upon this
head, because we know an abstract of the report of the committee,
appointed by the honourable house of commons, will soon be published,
to which we beg leave to refer our readers.

When the enquiry, relative to the _African_ trade, was under
consideration before the honourable house of commons in the year
1758, Mr. Pitt, that wise, great and able statesman, who has done
his king and country so many eminent and good services, was pleased
to declare, that he believed the then method of carrying on the
_African_ trade wanted alteration and amendment. He also added,
that when we should be so happy as to have a peace, he would be at
all times ready to examine into it, and give all the assistance in
his power to put it upon such a footing, that our plantations might
be supplied with the best and most valuable Negroes at reasonable
rates. We doubt not but he will make good his promise to lend his
able assistance, and also to recommend it to the administration
to begin such an enquiry, and continue it, in order to amend the
present, or form such other plan, as will preserve and secure that
valuable trade to the _British_ subjects, as the only and certain
means to encrease the produce of the _British_, and lessen that of
the _French_ colonies. For, with the islands we already possess, and
those which it appears by the preliminaries are to be ours, we shall
have a sufficient number to raise sugar, _&c._ for the consumption of
all Europe, if our British planters are properly supplied with the
best sort of Negroes for their cultivation.

When that gentleman has assisted in doing this further service to his
country, we sincerely wish him a long series of uninterrupted health,
to enjoy the fruits of an honourable and permanent peace; and that he
may be held in that esteem, reverence and honour, he so justly merits
from all lovers of this country.

Should such an enquiry be made, we hope some method will be found
out, to examine all persons at the bar of the house of commons upon
oath; for if that could be done, it would save the house a deal of
trouble, and prevent their receiving false information in matters of
the utmost consequence to this nation and its commerce. Because we
have heard people assert at that bar, what, to our knowledge, they
at the same time knew to be intirely false; which we most sincerely
wish could be remedied; or at least that persons examined there, upon
matters of importance, should be informed they will be examined with
respect to the same matter upon oath, at the bar of the house of
lords, which we presume may be done; and if done, will be attended
with great and good consequences to the whole community.

We cannot omit observing; that it was industriously reported,
propagated, and even urged as an argument in a great assembly, when
the state of the sugar islands was under their consideration in
the year 1758, that the British planters had formed a scheme for a
monopoly, by agreeing only to cultivate such part of their lands
as would produce but a certain quantity of sugar, in order to raise
the price, and exactingly to obtain as much for a little as a great
quantity; which was as true and likely to be the case, as if the
farmers of _Great Britain_, _Ireland_, _France_, _Sweden_, _Poland_
and _Denmark_ were to enter into a combination to leave such parts of
their lands uncultivated, with an unfair intent of raising the price
of grain; which we believe any person will readily admit can never be
brought about, although a correspondence may be easier, and in much
less time carried on between the farmers of those nations, than the
planters of our sugar colonies, as those of Jamaica cannot correspond
with Barbadoes, or any other part of the sugar islands, sooner than
by way of _Great Britain_ or _North America_, which would at least be
six months before they could hear from each other; that impediment
alone is sufficient to shew, that people thus separated, though ever
so well inclined, can never form a monopoly.

Besides, would it not be absurd, even to suppose that the farmers of
Great Britain, and other nations, who inhabit corn countries, do not
raise as much grain upon their farms as they possibly can procure
servants at reasonable wages, and can stock them with horses, cattle,
_&c._ at a cheap rate?

But if they are obliged to pay great wages to their servants, and
extravagant prices for their stock, they can then only put in
execution the cultivation of their lands by degrees, which is exactly
the case of the British planters; for had they a sufficient supply of
the proper sort of Negroes at reasonable rates, they would not let
any of their land lie idle that was worth being cultivated.

Therefore the true reason why some lands may lie unplanted in the
sugar islands is, it would greatly prejudice any planter in their
circumstances, to attempt to make new plantations with those tender
sort of Negroes, who have been carried to them in great numbers for
several years past, and sold at the extravagant prices from 50_l._
to 54_l._ and upwards each; whereas the best sort of Negroes, at
the time the late company cultivated and preserved the trade on the
_Gold Coast_, _Popo_, and _Whidah_, so as to prevent the French
carrying the best sort of Negroes to their plantations, who therefore
were sold in ours at the moderate prices of 20_l._ to 25_l._ a head
the highest; which was a very great encouragement to the planters
to clear their lands, and cultivate new plantations, enabling them
thereby greatly to improve and encrease the product of the islands,
which it must be their interest to do to the very extent of their
power, if their lands are situated with any sort of convenience for
water, or other carriage, to convey the product of their plantation
to the sea-ports, notwithstanding what was at that time advanced to
the contrary, to serve particular purposes, and in order to divert
the attention of the legislature from the real causes.

For whatever people may think, who are not well acquainted with
the colonies, because they see some of our planters come to settle
here in great opulence; that is no reason why those remaining in
the colonies are all rich; for if they were, few of them would stay
there: on the contrary, they are obliged to cultivate their lands
with the greatest pains and industry, in order to raise as much sugar
and other product as they possibly can, to pay the debts they owe:
for there is not a sugar island but what is considerably indebted to
Great Britain; so that whatever disadvantages the planters of our
colonies labour under, they must terminate by being prejudicial to
this country.

We cannot help once more observing, it is not having the most sugar
islands that will be the greatest benefit and advantage to the
mother-country, unless such islands can be supplied with a sufficient
number of the best Negroes for their cultivation; therefore as _Great
Britain_, _France_, _Spain_, _Holland_ and _Denmark_ have encreased
their number, and extended their colonies to such a degree, that
Africa cannot sufficiently supply them all with Negroes, including
those that the Portuguese want and carry off. On that account, in
our humble opinion, the contest ought to be, not who has the most
islands, but who can secure the trade to those parts of Africa,
where the best and greatest number of those useful people are to be
procured, as the only means to promote the interest and prosperity of
their colonies who may be so lucky to succeed in doing it, but will
be very disadvantageous to their competitors.

From what has been before observed, we presume it will be admitted
that every equitable method ought to be pursued and put in practice
by Great Britain, to secure to herself as much as possible the
African trade, in order to prevent the French purchasing Negroes. For
the same reason we take all the measures we possibly can, to hinder
the smuggling of wool, or any of our artificers and manufacturers
going to France. It cannot be too much insisted on that the Negroes
are of as much consequence and use for the cultivation of our
colonies, as the wool is to our manufactory, for these obvious
reasons; that the Negroes are the artificers, manufacturers, and
labourers in the colonies; because the whole process, from clearing
and preparing the ground to plant the sugar cane, and manufacturing
it into sugar and rum, and the putting it on board the ships, is the
work of Negroes; therefore it surely must be very prejudicial to our
interest to sell any of those useful people to the French, even were
they to pay gold or silver for them: there are, besides, much more
cogent reasons to be given why we should exert ourselves to prevent
the French, as much as we can, carrying them from Africa.

If there should at any time be more Negroes brought to the British
colonies than are necessary for the cultivation there, which we have
great reason to believe is seldom, or perhaps will never be the
case, then such Negroes may be sold to the Spaniards or Portuguese,
because they would pay gold or silver for them; and moreover, the
slaves so disposed of, would be employed in the mines of America, and
not in cultivating sugar and other plantation produce, as would be
the consequence if the French were allowed to be the purchasers; by
which means they would be effectually enabled to become our rivals
in trade, as well on account of their national encouragement and
advantages peculiar to them, by which they may be capacitated to sell
the product of their plantations considerably cheaper than we can
ours at foreign markets[17].

In order to remove the prejudices of many worthy and tender-minded
persons against the Negro-trade, which from a delicacy natural to
civilized nations, they declare to be quite contrary to all dictates
of humanity, and a disgrace to the professors of the christian
religion, we shall lay before them and the public a true state of
the case. As there is no occasion to enlarge how essentially and
absolutely necessary it is to have Negroes for the cultivation of our
colonies, which is explained in the foregoing sheets; therefore we
shall only beg leave to observe, by the best information that could
be obtained, Africa in general is divided into little kingdoms and
states, which, when at peace, the natives thereof breed slaves for
sale, as our farmers do stock on their farms, and sell them as their
necessity requires, which was a traffic carried on among themselves
before Europeans traded thither; and when overstocked, their practice
was putting to death (often with great torture) the prisoners taken
in war. Those that are bred slaves, are always very desirous to be
purchased by white people, as they are infinitely better used than by
their black masters, who allow them but a bare subsistance, and treat
them with the greatest barbarity; and were used to put several to
death through custom, when they buried persons above the common rank,
and oftentimes merely through wantonness, which is prevented by their
having found an advantageous and lucrative market for them.

Those Negroes taken in war, or prisoners for feloniously committing
crimes in despite of the laws, made by the officers commanding the
European forts, such laws having been agreed to by the natives
under their command and protection, also by those laws made by the
kings and princes in the inland countries, are now sold, but often
unwilling to go on board ships; perhaps, on account of having lived
in a better situation in their own country than those who have been
bred up in slavery from their infancy; therefore they often contrive
to make their escape, and by speaking the language, persuade others
to join and assist them to take the ship from the Europeans, of
which we have had too many fatal instances, and is entirely owing to
their ignorance in not knowing the place they are destined to; and
also that they will be much better treated and looked after in our
colonies than they ever were in their country; so that when bought by
Europeans, they are in a manner rescued from a state of misery as to
treatment; for in the colonies, when they are sick, they have great
care taken of them, and physicians to administer proper medicines for
their relief; which, on a similar occasion, their black masters would
give themselves no care or concern about them.

Besides, many of them are instructed in the principles of religion,
and become christians and men of property, which, from experience, we
know to be true, having talked with several who had no desire to see
their own country, living much more comfortably in our colonies. And
we think it would be politic to send two or three Negroes on board
every ship that goes to Africa, that can talk the different languages
of the countries the master of such ship intends to trade to, that
they might inform their countrymen how they had been treated. Such
measures, we are convinced, would prevent the loss of many lives,
by the Negroes being satisfied they were going where they would be
better treated than in their own country; and, at the same time, to
eradicate that opinion many of them have, that they are going to be
fed and eaten, which, if effected, would be a means to quiet their
minds, so as not to attempt rising on board of ships.

In all fluctuating societies, such as merchants trading to a country
so remote and little known as Africa, many more than the majority are
liable to be imposed on, even in the trade they intend to support,
a misfortune owing to the want of local knowledge, and personal
experience.

What chance for truth do those merchants in general stand, whose ears
few other accounts reach, than the imperfect relation of some master
of a ship, mariner or traditionalist, little to be credited, and less
to be depended upon? As to the former (if capable) he has little time
or opportunity to speculate into the _trade_, _manners_, _customs_,
and _temper_ of the _natives_, which they are seldom long enough at
a place to do; and who, from motives of immediate profit, pursue
measures they think most conducive to make a quick voyage, which is
all they turn their minds to; yet many of them, when they arrive in
Europe, will take upon themselves to give information in the most
interesting matters; which, without having lived in the country for
a considerable length of time, it is impossible for them to do with
accuracy and any degree of truth, notwithstanding such impositions
being propagated, have in general prevailed and influenced the minds
of people to such a degree, that those of certain boroughs, far from
having, as has been before observed, the least connection, interest,
or so much as acquainted in the most minute manner with the African
trade, presented their petitions to the honourable house of commons
to lay open the same; though many of the said boroughs have not since
sent the most trifling adventure to Africa, which at that time, and
before, when the forts were under the direction of the late royal
African company, the trade was much more free and open than it has
been since under the management of the committee of the company of
merchants trading to Africa, which we conjecture will appear from
the following extract of letters, certificates and affidavits[18],
we think it highly necessary, and even our duty, to lay before the
public, thereby to shew how far they have been imposed on by false
pretenders to knowledge.

  Extract of a letter from on board the Fly sloop at Bristol,
  Alexander Graham, master, dated 16 March, 1750, to the late royal
  African company’s governor at Cape Coast Castle.

  “I write this to acquaint you, that the French vessels sailed
  two days ago; I acknowledge myself obliged to you for the method
  you have taken to send them off, am very much obliged to you for
  your advice; have sent my armourer to alter some handcuffs, your
  permission will much oblige, _&c._”

  Extract of a letter from six British masters of vessels, dated on
  board the Polly in Annamaboa Road, 20 March, 1750. To the same.

  “Your favour of yesterday we received, and thank you for the
  promise of assistance, in protecting the privileges of the British
  subjects trading to this place, too much invaded by the French, and
  too little protected from home, but at this time shall have no
  occasion to trouble you. The French ship is sailed, _&c._”

  Extract of a letter from Richard Haskins, master of a ship from
  Bristol; dated Annamaboa Road, 27 Dec. 1750. To the same.

  “Am much obliged to you for your kind intelligence, and all other
  favours; I shall be obliged to you to dispatch the carpenter as
  soon as possible, being in great want of him. I am, _&c._”

  Extract of a letter from John Jepson, master of a snow from
  Rhode-Island, dated Annamaboa Road, 3 July, 1751. To the same.

  “I am sorry you are going off the coast: but however, as I can do
  no more for you, beg to return you my hearty and sincere thanks for
  your many favours from time to time, not only from your willingness
  to supply us with any thing in your power of tradesmen’s work,
  or any other thing; but also for your pains and vigilance in
  protecting the trade, _&c._ which will always be justifiable, and
  hope will redound to your honour and credit, which is the sincere
  wish, _&c._”

  Extract of two letters from Henry Ellis, master of the ship
  Hallifax, from Bristol, dated Annamaboa Road, the 13th, and 28th
  July, 1751. To the same.

  “The boards you sent me were of real service; I hope you will not
  omit charging any expence I put you to, as I can discharge that,
  though not so easily your good offices: we cannot help the death of
  the slaves, they are mortal; but do not think it adviseable to give
  them rice, as that kind of diet first gave them a swelling.”

  _N. B._ He landed all his sickly slaves, which were kept and taken
  care of in the castle.

  “We are not a little astonished at the pains these new agents take
  to prejudice the shipping here, by settling factories ashore to
  intercept the trade, and by giving equal prices with us, in order
  to distress us the more; it has already been some money out of the
  merchants pockets; we have been obliged to raise the price, or lie
  idle, under the hardships we endure. I cannot help observing the
  chagrin of the Liverpool captains, who loudly complain of the new
  management.”

  “I entirely join issue with you, that this new-fram’d project will
  become an errand job, though but for a season; for I look upon
  it, the physic of commerce, which, though it may disorder, as at
  present, will in the end work its cure. I am, _&c._”

  Extract of a certificate of eight British masters of vessels, dated
  Annamaboa Road, 3 July, 1751. To the same.

  “We being informed that a report hath been spread, that the late
  royal African company’s governor commanding on this coast, hath,
  during his command, acted in an arbitrary tyrannic manner, both to
  Europeans and natives on this coast; do hereby, in justice to the
  reputation of that gentleman, voluntarily certify, that we never
  heard of, or experienced, any part of his character or behaviour
  but what was humane and good, tending to promote the British
  interest and trade in these parts. And farther, that he has, from
  time to time, readily assisted us with all things each or any of us
  stood in need of at cape Coast Castle, during his command there,
  to the utmost of his power, as we sincerely believe. In witness
  whereof we have set our hands, _&c._”

  Certificate from Capt. Thomas Derbyshire, of Liverpool, relating to
  the use granted him of Tantumquery fort.

  “This is to certify whom it may concern, that during my making a
  voyage to the Gold Coast of Africa, and my lying at Annamaboa, I
  settled a factory at Lagoe; where from a disturbance there seemed
  likely to be in the country, I did not think my goods safe in the
  factory-house I had taken: and on my being at cape Coast Castle in
  the year 1750, and intimating the same to the then governor, he
  offered me the use of Tantumquery fort to carry on trade therein,
  which I accepted; and ordered my gunner to take my goods from the
  factory at Lagoe, and lodge them in Tantumquery fort, which he did,
  and continued in the same for upwards of three months to carry on
  his trade. And Mr. John Clifton, chief of said fort, had orders
  to render him every service and good office in his power, without
  fee or reward; neither did the said governor receive any benefit,
  profit or advantage in any shape or manner, in consideration for my
  having the use of the fort aforesaid. To certify which, I set my
  hand this 16 Aug. 1751, _&c._”

  Extract of a certificate, dated 28 Dec. 1753, from seven masters
  of ships, that in the late company’s time traded to the coast of
  Africa.

  “That the late company’s governor, during the continuance of his
  authority and command on the coast of Africa, did every thing
  in his power to promote the British interest and trade there:
  and from time to time assisted in doing us such service as our
  occasions required. In witness whereof we set our hands, _&c. &c._”

We think it unnecessary to trouble the public with any further proofs
relative to the conduct of the late royal African company and their
officers, to shew that they did every thing in their power to promote
the trade of the British subjects in Africa, as we shall reserve them
for a work that is in hand; therefore will only state some facts
regarding the African committee, their governors, and officers by
them appointed to have the command and management on the Gold Coast
and Whydah in Africa, for the public to form their judgment from.

That by an act of parliament, passed in the 23d year of the reign
of his late majesty, the trade to Africa was intended to be made
free and open to all his majesty’s subjects, without distinction or
preference. But contrary to the intentions of the said act, that
trade has been engrossed and monopolized by the officers of the
committee on the Gold Coast and Whydah, by their entering into a
confederacy or joint stock, and intermixing the government supplies
with their own merchandize, and by that means assorted themselves so
as to command said traffic.

Those officers have many other great advantages over free merchants
and traders, such as having a considerable part of their private
merchandize sent to them freight free, their extraordinary influence
over the natives, by the command of the several castles to deposit
their effects in, salaries, maintenance, European servants,
artificers, doctors, castle-slaves, canoe-men, canoes, medicines,
stores and necessaries of all sorts, being under their management and
direction. Besides, the presents to princes, caboceers, and great
men of the countries, being defrayed by the public, together with
the said benefits arising from the government supplies; and many
other advantages which they have taken, whereby they acquired such
a superiority over the free traders, as obliged the merchants of
Bristol and Liverpool to apply by memorial in the year 1753, stating
therein the foregoing facts to the lords commissioners of trade and
plantation for redress, which will appear by said memorial, supported
by the following affidavits.

  “Affidavit of William Brown, master of the Bristol, sworn 16 June,
  1753, saith, that when he was last in Africa carrying on trade,
  was informed by Brew, chief of Tantumquery, and Withers, chief of
  Winnebah, that they were engaged in partnership in the slave trade
  with Melvil, Young, and the other officers at cape Coast Castle.”

  “That Melvil and others told deponent, they expected a ship from
  Holland with a Dutch cargo, which ship they had some time before
  sent to Jamaica with slaves.”

  “That he was in company with Dacres, chief of Accra, who informed
  him Young was coming to turn him out of the fort, by reason he
  would not enter into partnership with Melvil and Young; that Dacres
  declared he should have been glad to have continued his employ, but
  rather than be uneasy he would quit it, and soon after did so. That
  deponent could not purchase from the chiefs of forts, slaves under
  an ounce and half, or two ounces a head more than he gave for those
  of equal goodness to the Negro traders, occasioned by the trade
  being carried on by the chiefs of the forts.”

  “That deponent was informed by the Negroes at Annamaboa, if he
  wanted to trade under the forts, he must take canoes and canoe-men;
  for the canoe-men under the forts were overawed by the chiefs,
  and they durst not assist him in trading; and deponent did so, and
  should have been under difficulties if he had not so done; and
  deponent found the Negroe traders under said forts, cautious and
  fearful of trading with him, lest the chiefs should know thereof,
  and sent to deponent in a private manner, when they had slaves to
  dispose of.”

  “That cape Coast, Tantumquery, Winnebah and Accra were used by
  the chiefs as repositories for their market slaves, and saw them
  lodged in said castle and forts; that Negroes will bear a high
  price as long as the chiefs are permitted to trade in them, which
  will destroy the trade with all persons, but the chiefs and those
  settled at the forts.”

  “Affidavit of James Hamilton, chief mate of the Polly of Bristol,
  sworn the same day as above. Swears to the same purport and effect
  as above set forth by Brown, in regard to the chiefs copartnership
  conversation with Dacres, and his being displaced, and the high
  price of slaves, and the reasons, _&c._ And then saith, that
  during his voyage, he hired a factory at Lagoe, and endeavoured to
  purchase slaves; on which Brew sent Negro traders and goods thither
  to oppose deponent; and Brew told deponent, it was impossible for
  him to trade to same advantage as Brew could, as he had so good
  assortment of goods; that if deponent gave eight ounces a head
  for slaves[19], Brew would give eight and half; and to intimidate
  deponent, declared he would send the servants of the forts up the
  paths, and prevent the trade coming down, and accordingly did send
  them with liquor, and carried the traders to his own fort. That
  Brew refused to sell deponent slaves; and his reason was, Melvil
  had wrote him not to sell, as he could get a better price at cape
  Coast. That Young at Winnebah refused deponent slaves at ten ounces
  per head, unless deponent would give him the very best of his
  cargo, which would have unsorted him.”

  “That Young refused him water for fifteen slaves, and deponent was
  obliged to give the natives fifteen shillings for forty gallons.
  That he went on shore with his gold taker at Succondee to trade,
  carried some checks with him: that Hippesly, the chief there, took
  the gold taker on one side, whispered him, and threatened to whip
  him if he ever saw him bring goods there to trade with the natives.”

  “That the natives and canoe-men at all the forts were fearful of
  trading with deponent, and declared they were afraid of being seen
  by the chiefs; that the forts were used as repositories for slaves,
  and that the trade will be hurt by the chiefs trading, as set forth
  by Brown.”

  “Affidavit of Alexander Graham, master of the Fly, sworn the same
  day, saith, that when he and Jenkins, commander of the Silvia,
  were trading at Annamaboa, they at first bought slaves at five
  ounces and half, and from thence to seven and a half per head, and
  went on in a good way. On a sudden found a stagnation, enquired
  the occasion, and were informed the prices were raised at the
  neighbouring forts; and this deponent was obliged to give an
  advanced price; that if the chiefs trade, the prices will be high,
  and the trade hurt.”

On the foregoing affidavits, and other allegations and facts, “the
merchants of Bristol and Liverpool presented a memorial to the lords
of trade, setting forth among other things,

“That an act was passed in the year 1750, for making the trade to
Africa free and open, for which end the management of the forts and
affairs were trusted to the care of nine persons, a committee, as
there set forth; that the said committee had the power of appointing
officers and servants for managing their affairs in Africa, and
discharging them at pleasure for not obeying their orders, or other
misdemeanors; and they were to take care that the orders given their
servants did not extend to public detriment, or the hurt of the free
traders.”

“That officers were appointed, and leave given to trade (but not
with foreigners, except Portuguese, for gold and tobacco) so that
they became the regulators of the market. The committee, by the act,
are annually to lay before the general meeting of the company of the
chambers of London, all resolutions, orders and instructions given
their servants previous to such meeting, and copies to be sent to
Bristol and Liverpool; but they have not so done.”

“That the committee’s chief agents, instead of regarding the interest
of their constituents, have acted opposite thereto, as soon as in
power. Instead of assisting the free trader, they entered into a
joint stock copartnership, and attempted a monopoly more formidable
than any could have been at home, as they were on the spot, and had
the whole power.”

“That the merchants of Bristol had advice of the chief proceedings
from their commanders, which on their return they found too true; and
that by the attempts of the chiefs to engross the trade, the prices
of slaves were raised much higher than ever known. Also that the
commanders were denied what strangers were always before assisted
with, _viz._ canoes, canoe-men, wood, water, _&c._”

“That a memorial was laid before the committee for their relief, but,
to their great surprize, they found their complaints were treated as
groundless surmizes, and unjust aspersions of the character of their
officers, arising only from personal prejudice and party interest; a
second and several repeated applications were made, and the committee
at last informed the managers, that they had referred the matter to
the lords of trade.” Accordingly their lordships heard the matters in
dispute between the merchants of Bristol and Liverpool, and that of
the committee.

  “And were of opinion, that the officers and servants employed by
  the committee, ought not to be allowed to trade for Negroe-slaves
  further than the amount of the salaries allowed them by the
  committee; and that such slaves should be disposed of for ivory,
  gold, bills of exchange, or other proper returns to England only.”

The committee paid no regard to their lordships opinion, consequently
we conjecture, no regulation or orders has since been given by them
to their servants; or if there has, the execution of such orders have
not been enforced; for it is a truth which cannot be contradicted,
that governor Melvil to his death, and the other officers of the
committee, during his command, carried on the Negroe trade, and
sent them from Africa to America for their own accounts, without
the least reserve or restraint; also that governor Senior, and the
officers under his command, did the same; and that governor Bell,
who commanded at cape Coast Castle, when the last advice came from
thence, did carry on a trade for Negroes, and continues to send the
Negroes so purchased, to America, in the same manner his predecessors
had done; which the gentlemen of the African committee must know was,
and is the practice; and also that it is most certainly contrary
to the true _spirit_, _meaning_ and _intention_ of the _act_ of
_parliament_, passed in the 23d year of his late _majesty’s reign_,
for _extending_ and _improving_ the _trade_ to _Africa_ (by which
the African company was established) and the opinion of the lords of
trade and plantation; for the legislative power could mean no other
than to put all his majesty’s subjects upon an equal footing.

But lest the gentlemen of the African committee’s memories should
fail, we will remind them of some things that surely could not have
happened without their knowledge; (to wit) the committee appointed
Mr. _Richard Brew_ in the year 1761, to the command of _Annamaboa_
fortress; although at the same time they could not but know that
he had fitted out the Brew, a large ship at Liverpool, and another
in the river Thames; the former with a large cargo for Africa; the
latter went to Holland for Dutch merchandize, to compleat her cargo,
to the manifest disadvantage of this country, because it prevents so
much of our manufactures and East India goods being exported; and
the _Dutch brandy_ and _Geneva_ interfere with the exportation of
_British spirits_, besides being of great disadvantage to the rum
trade from the _British colonies_ to _Africa_. Said ship returned
from Holland, and arrived at Portsmouth in or about the month of
July 1761, where Mr. Brew went on board; and also Messrs. Westgate
and Flemming, who had been in the committee’s service upon the coast
of Africa: but, as we have been informed, they are now gone out in
partnership with said Brew. We have also been informed, that the
cargoes of the said ships were landed in Africa, and deposited in the
fort of Annamaboa; and that Negroes were purchased with said cargoes,
and sent from thence to Jamaica for the account of Mr. Brew, and
those concerned with him.

It is also as true that Mr. Samuel Smith, merchant, in the Old Jury
in London, one of the committee of the company of merchants trading
to Africa, was the acting agent for Messrs. Brew, Westgate and
Flemming, during their residence in Africa; that he received their
consignments from thence, and acted for them by commission after
their arrival in England; likewise during their stay there, and since
their arrival in Africa; and also that Mr. Smith lately fitted in the
river Thames a large ship with a great cargo: and we have reason to
believe from good authority, that said ship and cargo was fitted out
for the account of Mr. Brew, and others concerned with him; which
ship is now on a voyage to Annamaboa; but whether any of the African
committee are concerned or interested in said ship, besides Mr.
Smith, we cannot take upon us to say.

We conjecture it never was intended by those gentlemen who prepared
the act of parliament, which appointed there should be a committee
of nine persons, who were to have the care of the forts in Africa,
with the charge and application of the monies granted by parliament
for their support, that any one of those persons should supply
merchandize to be paid for with the public money under their care
and management. However, such has been the case, as appears by
the committee’s accounts laid before parliament. The following is
an abstract of their last account for the year 1761, so far as it
relates to any of the committee-men furnishing merchandize; by that
our readers may form a judgment on their other annual accounts, they
being nearly the same as to the amount of what the African committee
supplied the public with. Abstract of the beforementioned account as
follows:

  Messrs. Touchett and company          _l._   _s._   _d._
  for Manchester goods                  1774    14     9

  Smith and company for Irish linen
  and provisions                         796    12    11

  Aufere and company for East
  India goods                            349     1     6

  Cust and company for ditto ditto       250     2     6

  Mr. William Boden for tobacco           39     0     6
                                        ----------------
                                        3209    12     2
                                        ----------------

The following are clauses of the act of parliament that provides for
the election of the African committee.

  “Page 550. And it is hereby further enacted, by the authority
  aforesaid, that in all future elections, the said committee of nine
  persons shall annually, on the third day of July in every year, be
  nominated and chosen as follows; that is to say, three of the said
  committee shall be nominated and chosen by the major part of the
  freemen of the said company, admitted to the freedom of the said
  company in London, who shall assemble for that purpose at London;
  three other persons to be of the said committee, shall be chosen
  and nominated by the major part of the freemen of the said company,
  admitted to the freedom of the said company in Bristol, who shall
  assemble for that purpose at Bristol; and three other persons to be
  of the said committee, shall be chosen and nominated by the major
  part of the freemen of the said company, admitted to the freedom
  of the said company in the town of Liverpool, who shall assemble
  for that purpose at Liverpool.”

  “Page 554. And be it further enacted, by the authority aforesaid,
  that no person shall be capable of being chosen, or acting as a
  committee-man above three years successively.”

By the foregoing clauses it was most certainly intended that the
election for committee-men should be free and uninfluenced, but that
has not happened; for there was great interest made by those who
were chosen committee-men the first year after the act passed, for
establishing _the company of merchants trading to Africa_. After
which, the several tradesmen employed by the African committee in
London, and by their friends in Bristol and Liverpool, took up their
freedom of the new company, in order to vote for committee-men; so
that, at the expiration of the first year, when the committee-men
that had been chosen for _London_, _Bristol_ and _Liverpool_ for
the preceding year, could act no longer, then, or at the expiration
of the three years (which we cannot now take upon us to say) three
new committee-men were chosen instead of three that went out, which
nine committee-men so chosen, continued to act for three years,
when the three other were again elected; by which means there are
twelve persons who take it by rotation alternatively, to be of the
committee or not, as they agree among themselves; on which account it
is a folly for any person, not being one of the twelve, to attempt
getting elected a committee-man for either _London_, _Bristol_,
or _Liverpool_; there having been as great interest made against
such persons who have offered themselves, as hath happened on some
occasions preceding the election of a member of parliament; therefore
we have the greatest reason to believe, there is not any person who
will again attempt to stand a candidate in opposition to one of the
twelve persons who have had the direction and management so long, of
which number those gentlemen are, we have mentioned in the account of
the merchandize supplied by the committee-men, page 51.

The several articles of merchandize purchased in Holland, are paid
for in money, or bills of exchange, which is very disadvantageous
to this country; and such goods may serve to make an assortment
with those paid for by the government, and sent to Africa for the
support of the forts there; which has been proved to have been the
case before, consequently may be so again. That fact being admitted,
and indeed it would be folly to think otherwise; what chance can
any private traders have, when the committee’s servants have such a
glaring emolument, besides so many other advantages over them? Were
there any reason to ground the least supposition, that all things
in Africa are carried on upon the square, and no methods practiced
by the officers that command the several forts to monopolize the
trade; can any one think even in such case, that private merchants,
or matters of ships, who are obliged to pay _customs_, _house_ and
_warehouse rents_, _servants_, and all sorts of other contingent
expences, can possibly carry on a trade in any degree of equality
with those persons, who are, as hath been before observed, exonerated
from every article of expence?

The committee’s servants having such advantages, can it be supposed
any private trader can stand any chance in trade with them, as said
trader must settle in a negroe town, in a mud house covered with
thatch, there being no other sort of dwelling to be got, without
carrying tradesmen of all sorts from Europe to build it, which would
be attended with too great an expence and risk for any private
adventure to undertake? Therefore, on account of the frequent fires
that happen in negroe towns, persons well acquainted with them, would
not insure any property lodged therein for twenty-five _per cent._
annually. That alone is sufficient to deter any one from settling,
except some of the old or new companies discarded servants, whose
narrow circumstances discourage them from returning to Europe, not
knowing what else to do with themselves; for there has not one of
the young men from Bristol or Liverpool, _&c._ that were to have
been intrusted with cargoes by their relations and friends, to go
and settle under the protection of the British forts in Africa, has
yet made a single attempt to do it, though that was made use of as
an argument, and enforced with great energy by gentlemen, to obtain
a dissolution of the late royal African company (and in which they
succeeded). But no such boasted consequence has taken place, because
the people of those places were not to be lulled on to adventure
their property, under the notion of a free trade. They very well knew
what hardships must attend those who were necessitated to settle in a
negroe town, from a knowledge, as soon as they did, they must become
subservient in a manner, and brother citizens with the negroes. It is
a joke to think they can make use of the forts to lodge and defend
their properties in; for the very persons who (we should imagine) by
the spirit and intention of the act of parliament, ought to be their
defenders, will take every measure, in proportion as they rival them,
and curtail their trade, to exercise their power over the natives, to
prevent the private trader succeeding with them, which will create
disputes between the officers commanding the forts and the towns
people under them, in which every private trader must bear a part;
for no man can settle in a negroe town without paying his _freedom_,
and entering into a league to become a _native_, and partake of
that _township’s misfortunes_, _advantages and customs_. Is there
any difference then between a European trader and an African? None!
one is a native black Negroe, and the other is become a white one:
so that whenever a dispute happens between _the natives_ and the
officers aforesaid, the indenizened European will be under the
compulsive necessity of joining his black fellow _townsmen_ against
his _countrymen_ and _fortress_, which the _British_ nation intended
for his _preservation_ in time of _danger_, and last _resort_.

From what we have before advanced, our readers may naturally wonder
if the trade to Africa, where the forts are situated, is carried on
so much to the disadvantage of the British traders, and so greatly
for the benefit of the officers of the African committee, why said
traders do not continue their complaints, in order to have their
grievances redressed. We conjecture one reason for their not doing
so, is the difficulties they had to encounter when they presented
their former complaint to obtain satisfaction, which arose from the
opposition raised against them by the African committee, who refused
to give their officers such orders, as would have obliged them to
put in execution the _lords of trade and plantations opinion_. Being
defeated in their first attempt, it is natural to suppose they were
fearful of applying again to the legislative power, lest the methods
pursued to carry on that valuable branch of commerce, since it
has been under the management of the African committee, should be
maturely and attentively enquired into; for there has been, and is
now, as much reason for such examination, as there was in the year
1753, 1755, 1756 and 1758. But then it began to become too serious;
and if continued fairly, might have been a means of putting the
forts upon a new and respectable establishment, such as would have
enabled the officers commanding them, to have secured the natives
under their protection from the danger they may be in from enemies
of their own colour, and the arbitrary injustice often imposed upon
them by the officers of our good friends and allies. The Dutch
residing in Africa, to have prevented said _Dutch officers_, by
their superior power, from wresting violently and unfairly any part
of the territories belonging to the _British forts_, or detaining
and imprisoning any of the natives living under their protection,
both which they have illegally done since the decline of the late
company’s power, and confined a number of them, notwithstanding all
remonstrances made by the British officers, till that _noble_ and
_gallant_ commander, the present honourable lord _How_ arrived in his
majesty’s ship _Glory_, with the _Swan_ sloop under his command, upon
the Gold Coast, in the year 1751, who soon after his arrival, did
examine with the greatest attention, all the original papers relative
to the cause of the dispute that happened between the officers of the
English and Dutch companies. After such examination, he demanded from
the Dutch general the prisoners he had confined during said dispute
in the castle of St. George’s D. Elmina, the principal Dutch fort
upon the coast of Africa in that noble manner which it has everbeen
the invariable rule of that judicious, worthy, and great commander to
pursue in the service of his country[20].

It is to be hoped that the British forts will be put upon such an
establishment, that the officers commanding them will be sufficiently
empowered to hinder the Dutch officers from exercising that arbitrary
power they have done, and continued to do, over the _Portugueze_ upon
the _Gold Coast_ of _Africa_, to prevent their trading at the British
settlements, in open violation of a treaty concluded between the
English and Dutch principal officers in Africa, and ratified by both
_companies_ in _Europe_[21].

If the African committee has not represented that affair in a true
light to the government, we are surprized they have neglected it, as
it is a very valuable commerce now wholly engrossed by the Dutch; who
will not suffer the master or supercargo of any _Portugueze_ vessel
to trade at the English _forts_, or with the _British_ subjects,
notwithstanding the beforementioned treaty, which, perhaps, might
be deemed obsolete, since the dissolution of the late company. If
that should be the case, then, in our humble opinion, it ought to be
renewed, as well as many other regulations made between the English
and Dutch in Africa.

If the British officers should once again obtain that influence and
power so essentially necessary for them to have, in order to open the
trading roads to the most distant inland countries of Africa, so long
stopped, which would be of immense advantage to this country, and, at
the same time, to prevent the subjects of France hereafter carrying
to their colonies the most valuable Negroes, as we have observed they
did before the war, and which will in a great measure be proved, by
the extracts of the following letters from the captains Strange and
Wyndham, commanders of two of his majesty’s ships war, dated Africa,
20th Sept. 1740, and 30th Aug. 1742.

  Capt. Strange writes to the following purport:

  “The French, by the advantages of their goods, especially Brandies,
  occasions a great price they give for their slaves, which has
  brought the English and Dutch trade to the lowest ebb.”

  Capt. Wyndham writes as follows:

  “This concludes the present state of the royal African factories;
  and as to the Dutch factories, they, as far as I can learn, make no
  great hand of their trade any more than the English; the French,
  who has ten ships on the coast to our one, seem to flourish and
  carry all before them.”

We think it necessary here to observe, that notwithstanding almost
all the trade had been for some years before, and at that time,
carried on by the French on that part of the coast where the most
valuable Negroes were to be got; the separate British traders made
no application to the legislative power to prevent such pernicious
commerce, though several remonstrances were made for that purpose by
the late royal African company to the government; who also did lay
before the public, in several letters inserted in the daily papers,
as well as by pamphlets, the danger of the French incroachments.

Yet as soon as the private traders found the said company applying
to parliament for money, to put their forts upon a proper and
respectable footing, to prevent foreign innovations upon the
territory and trade under their care, they took the alarm, awaked
from their lethargy, strained every nerve, and put every scheme in
execution their invention pointed out, to prevent the company’s
succeeding, and to obtain their dissolution, which they compleated
in the year 1750. But how far the African trade has been improved
thereby, in upwards of twelve years that the African committee have
had it under their direction and management, will appear from the
facts and truths we have before stated, to which we beg leave to
refer, and to the judgment of our readers.

Thus far we can undertake to say with truth, notwithstanding the
great noise and clamour raised at that time by the African merchants
for an open trade; it was then much more open and free for all
British subjects trading thither, than it has been since under the
direction of the African committee, and the national grants of money
more regularly and fairly accounted for, as the late company had,
for some years before, sent no ship to Africa, but freighted the
merchandize, stores and provisions purchased with the money granted
by parliament on board private ships; nor were their officers or
servants permitted to trade otherwise than to barter to the best
advantage. The merchandize purchased with the _public money_ for the
better support of the _forts_, out of which said servants could
neither make embezzlement or advantage to themselves, according to
the established rules laid down by the company, and the method by
which their principal officers and other servants were to account for
the same, who were obliged to give ample and sufficient security,
strictly to adhere and conform to such rules. All persons in the late
company’s service, of what station soever, that were entrusted with
any of their or the government’s effects, whether the value was much
or little, they were obliged to keep a true account of all their
receipts and disbursements in writing, and at the end of every two
months at farthest, to render to the council, which presides at the
principal fort, two originals signed by said person so intrusted, and
attested to be true by some other of the company’s servants, who had
been privy to his transactions. That the then accountant residing at
the principal fort, examined and made his remarks upon the account
so rendered; and required vouchers in writing for such transactions
as were therein mentioned to have been had with Europeans, it
being impracticable to have written vouchers for dealings with the
natives[22].

That said accountant laid all accounts so rendered, with his remarks
thereon, before the said _council_, who _examined_, _allowed_,
or _disallowed_ such accounts, _&c._ made such _deductions_ or
_abatements_ to as they saw cause. That afterwards every such account
was returned to the accountant as one of the vouchers from which he
was to compose the general books to be sent home to the company.
That by general Books is meant, journals and ledgers, where the
collections, arising from the vouchers beforementioned, were reduced
into order and method. That the council abroad had not power to
pass, or allow any _account_ or _voucher finally_; every thing being
subject to the _company’s_ future _examination_ and _approbation_ in
_England_.

That each journal and ledger contained the accounts of six months,
which after having been duly stated and balanced abroad, they were
sent home to the company by the first conveyance, together with all
the original vouchers from which they were composed and signed;
duplicates thereof were deposited in the principal forts, in case
of loss or accident. That as soon as possible after the arrival of
the said journals and ledgers in England, they were compared by the
company’s accountant general (who was one of the first accountants
in Europe) with the vouchers, and the said vouchers themselves
were examined; that objections and deductions were thereupon made
by the company, when due cause was found for so doing. It must now
surely clearly appear, that so many examinations of the books and
accounts, made by persons whose private interest had not the least
connexions with each other, must render it extreamly difficult for
the late company’s servants to _embezzle_ or _misapply_ any of the
effects committed to their charge with _impunity_, or without being
_detected_.

That after the examinations aforesaid of the accounts, they were
delivered to the _auditor_ of his _majesty’s imprest_, and after they
were examined and compared by the deputy-auditor with the vouchers,
and certified by him they were right, then the company obtained a
_quietus_ to discharge them from any _sum_ or _sums_ of _money_ so
accounted for, that they had received from the _public_; having
first sworn to the truth of such part of said accounts as had been
transacted under their own inspection, in Europe before one of the
barons of his majesty’s exchequer.

The following is the copy of a clause from the act of parliament
_for extending and improving the trade to Africa_, directing in what
manner the committee are to account for the monies they receive from
the public for the support of the forts in Africa. In page 556.

  “It is enacted that the committee shall, within one month after
  the expiration of the year, for or during which they shall have
  been chosen committee-men, lay before the cursitor baron of the
  exchequer, an account of all the money received by the committee
  during the preceding year, and of the application thereof, upon
  oath. And the said cursitor baron shall, within one month after the
  said account shall be laid before him, examine, pass, and audit the
  same; and for the better discovering of the truth of such account,
  the said cursitor baron is hereby empowered to examine any of the
  said committee-men, and such other person or persons as he shall
  judge necessary, upon oath, touching the articles or particulars
  in such account expressed, or such of them as the said cursitor
  baron shall think fit; which account, so audited and passed by the
  cursitor baron, shall be final and conclusive, and shall be a full
  and absolute discharge to the said committee-men, without their
  being compelled to give or render any further or other account
  thereof.”

By the foregoing clause, the African committee is only obliged to
account for the application in _Europe_ of any monies they receive
from government, or otherwise, for the support of the _African
forts_, by laying their annual account before the cursitor baron,
how they have appropriated said monies, whether by purchasing and
shipping merchandizes, stores, and other supplies for the use of
the forts, or of any other manner they might have disposed of the
same[23].

By said clause, the cursitor baron is obliged to audit and pass the
committee’s account in one month after it is laid before him; though
he should have objections thereto, as he had to their accounts for
years 1754, 1755 and 1756. However, he passed them, but submitted
it to the house of commons to allow some charges in said accounts,
or not, that he certainly thought were charged contrary to act of
parliament, or he would not have objected to them. But that would
have appeared as well as many other facts, with respect to their
management and accounts, if the report, consisting of 87 pages,
of the committee, appointed by the honourable house of commons to
examine into the state and condition of the forts in Africa in the
year 1758, had been examined into. All we can take upon us to say
with respect to that affair is, said report was prevented being taken
into consideration by the house, in consequence of a _motion_ being
_made_ and _seconded_ for such _purpose_, by the _African committee’s
friends_.

We can with truth undertake to say, that many irregularities in the
African committee’s accounts were pointed out during the examination
before the several committee’s appointed by the house; upon which
they desired leave to bring in subsequent accounts to clear up
such objections as had been made, one of which was presented to
the committee the 22d April, 1756, wherein the African committee
deducted from the balance of a former account they had presented
1891_l._ sterling. We shall only quote this one instance, to shew how
necessary it is that the African committee and their servants should
be accountable to the public in the same manner the late African
company was, for any monies they are intrusted with by government,
for the application of said monies on the coast of Africa, before
they should obtain a discharge for the same, which would lay them
under a necessity to examine minutely into the accounts they receive
from their officers in Africa, of the application of said monies
there; which, as they are now no-ways accountable for, we may, we
hope without being thought severe, presume is not done; which will,
in a great measure, appear by the subsequent account before quoted:
besides, we fear people, who have accounts of their own to look
after, seldom give themselves much trouble about those of the public,
unless obligated thereto.

When the officers, who have the application of the public money in
Africa, are once satisfied that their accounts will undergo a strict
examination by the committee, and also at the auditor of the imprests
office; that it will induce them to be careful how they dispose of
the merchandize, _&c._ committed to their charge; as such _officers_
and their _sureties_ will be liable to make good any deduction
there, may be made from their accounts. It will likewise be very
advantageous to the inferior servants of the committee; for such
good purpose, a method can be pointed out to prevent the merchandize
purchased with the public money being made use of by the superior
officers in trade, for their own account and emolument, to the great
injury of the others, many instances of which we have to produce;
also that the soldiers, under-servants, and company’s slaves have
been paid out of the refuse goods that the commanding officers had
taken in the course of their trade.

A single instance of such inhumanity to the inferior servants we
think sufficient to trouble the public with, which happened during
governor Melvil’s command; and that we should not now particularly
take notice of, but as it fell under our observation when we were
upon the spot. It also was a charge urged against Mr. Melvil when
living, which he never attempted to contradict, to wit, that John
Sweidger, a Prussian, and Gardiner at Cape Coast, desired his
discharge, wanting to go to his own country. Mr. Melvil, the then
governor and treasurer at Cape Coast Castle, whose business it was
to give written orders upon the warehouse (or storekeeper) to pay
the servants, gave said Sweidger a note upon the warehouse-keeper,
for wages due to him, amounting to 28_l._ gold value, which is about
27_l._ 2_s._ 6_d._ sterling, which said warehouse-keeper offered
to pay in guns, that would not even purchase the poor man a little
fresh provisions for his voyage. After repeated applications to
the governor and warehouse-keeper, finding he could not obtain any
thing else, he offered the governor’s note for 28 _l._ to sale to
several of the servants in the castle; and at last sold it to James
Hinch, the overseer of the slaves, for eight pounds. That oppressive
transaction fully points out how necessary it is that some other
method of accounting for the government’s supplies should be adopted,
and carried into execution, which surely there cannot be the least
objection to.

For example, we will suppose any gentleman in England to have an
estate in Africa, and that he was to order Messrs. Trueman and
company, or any other respectable merchants in the city of London,
to send out a steward to superintend and take care of the improvement
of such estate; and that they were to take security from said
steward for the value of any monies or merchandize, _&c._ that he
may be entrusted with, to pay the servants residing thereupon, and
other expences; also charges of building and repairs. Is it to be
supposed said gentlemen, notwithstanding he had the greatest faith
in, and opinion of the integrity and honesty of said merchants,
would be satisfied with their giving him an account only of their
having sent such steward, merchandize, stores and provisions to his
estate, without an account from the steward, properly vouched, of the
application thereof in Africa? Surely no! then if a private person
thinks it necessary to have such an authenticated account, we submit
it to the judgment of our readers to determine, whether they think
it reasonable the public should expect the same or not. We, for our
own parts, are inclined to believe, that people intrusted with the
application of public monies, at so great a distance as Africa,
when they can make such immense advantage of it as the committee’s
officers can, will be induced to embrace the opportunity, however
disadvantageous it may be to their country, when they are satisfied
little care will be taken how they account for the same.

We shall conclude this pamphlet, with inserting a copy of a petition,
signed by the planters of the island of Barbadoes, in the year
1710. The reasons and observations contained therein, in our humble
opinion, fully point out, that they foresaw what has in effect since
happened; therefore we beg leave to submit it to our readers to form
their own judgment upon.

  To the queen’s most excellent majesty,

  The humble petition of several planters and others, inhabitants of
  your majesty’s island of Barbadoes,

  Sheweth,

  “That the tender care and regard your majesty hath constantly had
  of all your subjects, encourages your petitioners, who are deeply
  concerned in the trade to Africa. The constant supply of Negroes at
  moderate prices, being the chief support of this colony; whereby
  we can only be enabled to preserve the staple of sugar, and other
  commodities, and to afford them in greater quantities, and cheaper
  than other nations; most humbly beg leave to lay before your
  majesty, that for many years, while the royal African company had
  the sole management of that trade, this island was duly supplied
  with a sufficient number of Negroes at moderate prices, from 10
  _l._ to 20 _l._ per head the highest, which was a very great
  encouragement; and enabled us greatly to improve the manufacture
  of this island. But for several years past, since the trade has
  been laid open, the number of Negroes imported by the royal African
  company, and separate traders together, have not been sufficient
  to supply this island; and those which have been imported, have
  been sold at extravagant prices, from 20 _l._ to 40 _l._ per head,
  especially those which are tolerably good; which your petitioners
  conceive to have been occasioned by the different interests of the
  separate traders, each bidding upon the other; of which the natives
  upon the coast taking advantage, have raised the price of their
  own commodities, and sunk the price of those of Great Britain, and
  this island; which is an unspeakable damage, and discouragement to
  your petitioners, tends to the ruin of this trade, the lessening
  your majesty’s revenue, and the navigation of Great Britain.”

    “Therefore your petitioners humbly pray, that the British
    interest on the coast of Africa may be preserved; and the trade
    put upon such a foot, that a sufficient number of Negroes may
    be had upon the coast, on moderate terms, and your petitioners
    supplied at reasonable rates here.

  “And your petitioners, as in duty bound, shall ever pray.”

  Barbadoes,
  Aug. 1, 1710.

                                      “Robert Vaughan,
                                      “Thomas Carney, _&c. &c. &c._”


_FINIS._


_ERRATA._

  Page 10, last line, for _this I_, read _this we_; p. 11. l. 19,
  for _editor is_, r. _editors are_; p. 14, l. 2, for _made me_, r.
  _made us_; p. 20, l. 5, for _this I_, r. _this we_; p. 21, l. 3,
  for _induced me_, r. _induced us_; p. 23, l. 30, for _assertions_,
  r. _assertion_; p. 26, l. 28, for _that_, r. _those_; p. 27, l.
  18, for _those kept_, r. _those that were kept_; p. 35, l. 7, for
  _I have_, r. _we have_; p. 37, l. 37, for _ben_, r. _been_; p. 46,
  l. 12, for _taken_, r. _taker_; p. 49, l. 10, for _committee_, r.
  _company_; p. 56, in note, l. 1, for _this ship_, r. _the ship_.


FOOTNOTES:

[1] It is here humbly meant, not to send those sailors that may be
pressed out of colliers, or coasting vessels, directly on southern
voyages, till they have been used to live upon salt provisions for
some time on board ships of war in a cold climate.

[2] Supposed to be paid for in plantation-produce.

[3] It appears by the accounts of that board, there has been expended
by them to the 31st March, 1761, in finishing said fort 15,024_l._
18_s._ 3_d._ so that rebuilding it has cost 34,590_l._ 12_s._ 5_d._
sterling, which fort is only useful for the defence of the Negroes
in the town under it, and to protect them from their enemies of
their own colour, who have no cannon or mortars, and to defend the
landing-place, that no ship of force can get near.

[4] His grace the d—e of N——le, s——y of st——e; the right honourable
H—y P—lh—m, first lord of the t——y, and c——r of the e——r.

[5] The African committee have also received to the end of the year
1756, 1620_l._ 8_s._ 8_d._ for some of the late company’s effects,
and for admissions into the new company.

[6] For several years before the war, the French received from
foreign nations above 1,000,000_l._ sterling for the article of sugar
only; besides a large sum for indigo, and other West India products;
the loss of which will induce them, without delay, to push on their
trade to Africa with the utmost vigour, which, we know, they are
making great preparations to do, that sufficiently points out the
necessity for some measures to be speedily taken to prevent their
succeeding.

[7] The officers commanding the out-forts, had absolute orders not to
trade with the French.

[8] For mercenary troops are to be hired in Africa, as well as in
Europe, and at a much cheaper rate.

[9] In case the French were not permitted to carry them away, as they
did before the roads were stopt.

[10] 50,000 ounces of gold dust at 3_l._ 17_s._ 6_d._ an ounce, is
193,750_l._

[11] 30 tons of ivory, on an average worth about 220_l._ a ton, is
6,600_l._

[12] Which was upwards of 26,666 guineas annually.

[13] We think it proper to observe, which we conjecture the merchants
will not attempt to deny, that they only put on board their ships
such cargoes as the masters judge will be sufficient to purchase the
number of Negroes each ship will carry, which when compleated, they
will sell any small remainder of their cargoes for gold or ivory,
if to be got: but they often find a difficulty in doing it, for the
reasons before advanced; and they have many times been obliged to
carry them from Africa for want of purchasers, entirely owing to
their giving such great prices for Negroes.

[14] If the French are allowed to trade on the Gold Coast, a cargo
to purchase 300 Negroes, will cost, if we may judge by former times,
above 6000_l._

[15] As would have appeared by the report of the committee of the
honourable house of commons, in the year 1758, had it been examined
into.

[16] There was issued to the African committee, by warrant from the
right honourable the lords commissioners of the treasury, in the year
1751, 7140_l._ 14_s._ 3_d._ out of the vote of credit for 800,000_l._
notwithstanding several objections were made before the committee of
the honourable house of commons that such sum was not due.

[17] Because it will employ a great number of French ships and
sailors, and be a market for their manufactures, which they sell,
and also their East India goods, cheaper considerably than we can
purchase ours, which must consequently be hurtful to our navigation,
lessening at the same time the consumption of our manufactures.

Besides, the competition between the traders of both nations would
give to the black dealers an opportunity of raising the price of
their Negroes, which advance the French can better afford than we,
as must appear from what is beforementioned, as well as from the
following fact; which is, they pay an anchor of brandy or two, and
at some places three or four, in the price of a slave, at the rate
of four pounds each anchor, containing about eight gallons, and
costs in France but from eight to ten shillings. Whereas there is
not any article can be bought in England so profitable and vendable
a commodity among the blacks for thirty shillings (as French brandy)
that will pay in the purchase of a slave at four pounds.

This observation is chiefly meant to point out how necessary it is
to hinder, as much as possible, the French from trading to Gambia,
Senegal, or between cape Appolonia and the river Volta, where the
British forts are situated, and where much the greatest numbers of
the most valuable Negroes are to be procured, which surely we have a
right to do, and may be effected, if proper measures are pursued for
so desirable a purpose.

[18] The original letters and certificates, with authentic copies of
the affidavits, are in the hands of the publisher.

[19] An ounce is a nominal value set upon goods, which cost about
40_s._ in Europe; but sold in trade on the coast of Africa at 4_l._

[20] He came to an anchor nearer to Elmina fort, with the ship and
sloop under his command, than any merchant ship ever had been,
and sent an officer on shore to demand the prisoners, which the
Dutch general immediately complied with, to the great joy of their
countrymen residing under the British forts, at their being restored
to their liberty.

[21] “That such Portugueze ships as shall come to anchor in any of
the English roads belonging to any of the English forts or factories,
shall not be molested by any Dutch ship or ships belonging to the
said company, nor be blocked up by them in the said English roads,
nor attacked and seized at their going out of the said roads; neither
shall they offer to seize any ship or ships, that have first put
themselves under the protection of any British fort, or being in
possession of any English vessel, they having one of the said royal
African company’s servants on board certifying the same.”

“That on the other side, none of the English forts, or company’s
ships, shall attack, or seize, any Portugueze which were first in
possession of any Dutch West India company’s ships; neither shall
the English general, or chief director for the time being, grant
passports to any Portugueze ships, going to or from Brazil, or any of
the Portugueze islands.”

[22] What was paid to the natives for ground-rent, or water-custom,
or to the company’s slaves, which appeared by their lists, or to
canoe-men, or other free Negroes, each article was particularized in
the late company’s officers accounts in such manner, as that no fraud
could be committed.

[23] By such mode of accounting, the committee may obtain a discharge
for the money granted by parliament, before the ship or ships that
have the merchandize, stores, _&c._ on board said money purchased,
sails out of the _river Thames_. Therefore, if said _merchandize_ or
_stores_ are never landed in _Africa_ for the use of the _forts_, we
presume the _committee_ are no farther _accountable_ for _them_.




  TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE

  Footnote [15] is referenced twice from page 29.

  Obvious typographical errors and punctuation errors have been
  corrected after careful comparison with other occurrences within
  the text and consultation of external sources.

  Some hyphens in words have been silently removed, some added,
  when a predominant preference was found in the original book.

  Except for those changes noted below, all misspellings in the text,
  and inconsistent or archaic usage, have been retained.

  Pg iii: ‘above allegagations’ replaced by ‘above allegations’.
  Pg 1: ‘meer alienation’ replaced by ‘mere alienation’.
  Pg 3: ‘many falshoods’ replaced by ‘many falsehoods’.
  Pg 4: ‘make the ballance’ replaced by ‘make the balance’.
  Pg 6: ‘to undersel them’ replaced by ‘to undersell them’.
  Pg 11: ‘For I believe it’ replaced by ‘For we believe it’.
  Pg 12: ‘for so I must’ replaced by ‘for so we must’.
  Pg 14: ‘a ballance of trade’ replaced by ‘a balance of trade’.
  Pg 15: ‘sorry I am to say’ replaced by ‘sorry we are to say’.
  Pg 19: ‘houshold servants’ replaced by ‘household servants’.
  Pg 23: ‘inteterest themselves’ replaced by ‘interest themselves’.
  Pg 24: ‘villify and render’ replaced by ‘vilify and render’.
  Pg 25: ‘intercouse and trade’ replaced by ‘intercourse and trade’.
  Pg 26 Footnote [11]: ‘on an average, is worth about’ replaced by
         ‘on an average worth about’.
  Pg 31: ‘such an equiry’ replaced by ‘such an enquiry’.
  Pg 34: ‘I presume it’ replaced by ‘we presume it’.
  Pg 34: ‘the smuggling wool’ replaced by ‘the smuggling of wool’.
  Pg 35: ‘them frm Africa’ replaced by ‘them from Africa’.
  Pg 37: ‘crimes in despight’ replaced by ‘crimes in despite’.
  Pg 47: ‘The committe, by’ replaced by ‘The committee, by’.
  Pg 48: ‘the mananagers, that’ replaced by ‘the managers, that’.
  Pg 54: ‘were ncecessitate to’ replaced by ‘were necessitated to’.
  Pg 55: ‘indenizend European’ replaced by ‘indenizened European’.
  Pg 56: ‘become to serious’ replaced by ‘become too serious’.
  Pg 60: ‘two orignals signed’ replaced by ‘two originals signed’.
  Pg 61: ‘stated and ballanced’ replaced by ‘stated and balanced’.
  Pg 62: ‘the committe are to’ replaced by ‘the committee are to’.
  Pg 64: ‘from the ballance of’ replaced by ‘from the balance of’.
  Pg 66: ‘improvemeut of such’ replaced by ‘improvement of such’.
  Pg 66: ‘committe’s officers’ replaced by ‘committee’s officers’.

*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 69348 ***